独立董事会能改善非营利性公司治理吗?

K. Boozang
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引用次数: 6

摘要

各种各样的力量汇聚在一起,迫使非营利组织的董事会跟随营利性部门的领导,变得独立,即使来自商业部门的经验证据表明,董事会独立于管理层并没有达到预期,而且可能与削弱公司业绩有关。这种背景,以及非营利部门治理研究的缺乏,表明非营利组织过早地加入了独立董事会的行列。关于为什么非营利组织的董事会应该是独立的,没有令人信服的阐述——独立董事会应该能够独特地完成什么,需要多少独立董事来确保董事会的独立性,有什么证据表明独立董事会在实现明确的目标方面是有效的,更不用说这些目标是否可以量化和衡量。治理改革的早期结果表明,在当今许多非营利组织的董事会会议室里,公司的合规性取代了对使命的维护和追求。毫无疑问,非营利组织的董事可以而且确实在为自己的利益行事,做出非法行为(如果经常是天真的),或者不当处理委托给他们管理的资产。但是,过度关注法律和财务问责,以及随之而来的任命符合合规要求的董事的压力,可能会转移人们对一个更重要问题的注意力,即在企业履行使命和为选民服务的过程中,什么样的董事会将成为企业资源的最佳管家。通过鼓励非营利组织董事会在董事的技能组合方面变得更加多样化,或许也能有效地实现当前治理改革的目标;填补当前非营利组织法规中存在的漏洞,这些漏洞允许薄弱的治理结构;法定要求超过一定规模的非营利组织进行财务审计;建议监察主任到场;并在法律上强制推行积极扩大的透明度概念。
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Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate Governance?
A variety of forces have converged to pressure nonprofit boards to follow the lead of the for-profit sector to become independent, even while empirical evidence from the business sector suggests that board independence from management is not fulfilling expectations, and may be related to weakened firm performance. This background, and the paucity of governance studies in the nonprofit sector, suggests that nonprofits are prematurely jumping onto the independent board bandwagon. There is no convincing articulation of why nonprofit boards should be independent - what is it that independent boards are supposed to be able to uniquely accomplish, how many independent directors are required to ensure board independence, what evidence exists that independent boards are effective at achieving the articulated goals, not to mention whether such goals are quantifiable and measurable. Early results of governance reform suggest that corporate compliance supersedes preservation and pursuit of mission in many of today's nonprofit board rooms. No question exists that nonprofit directors can and do act in their self-interest, behave illegally (if often naively), or mishandle the assets entrusted to their stewardship. But a disproportionate focus on legal and financial accountability, with the attendant pressure to appoint directors qualified for performance of compliance activities, can divert attention from the more important question of what kind of board will serve as the best steward of the entity's resources as it pursues its mission and serves its constituencies. The goals of current governance reform might just as effectively be served by encouraging nonprofit boards to become more diverse in the skill sets of their directors; closing the gaps in current nonprofit statutes that permit weak governance structures; statutorily requiring financial audits by nonprofits over a certain size; recommending the presence of monitoring directors; and legally imposing an aggressively expanded conception of transparency.
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