美国民主反应中的利益集团与不平等

Martin Gilens
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在本文中,我考察了公众偏好和政府政策之间的联系在多大程度上偏向于高收入美国人的偏好。我使用了1981年至2002年间关于政策变化的近2000个调查问题的原始数据集,发现公众想要什么和政府做什么之间存在着中等强度的关系,尽管存在对现状的强烈偏见。但我也发现,当不同收入水平的美国人的政策偏好不同时,实际的政策结果强烈地反映了最富裕人群的偏好,而与贫穷或中等收入美国人的偏好几乎没有关系。在记录了这些不平等之后,我研究了利益集团在塑造对公众偏好的政策响应方面的作用。我表明,无论是利益集团结盟的方向,还是利益集团参与的程度,都不会显著改变对不同收入水平的美国人的政策响应模式。利益集团确实影响联邦政策,但他们的影响独立于公众的偏好。如果利益集团在一个问题上的平衡与富裕的美国人的偏好一致,富裕的美国人更有可能看到他们的偏好反映在政策结果中,但富裕阶层将政策朝一个方向或另一个方向移动的程度与利益集团的影响无关。利益集团有时确实会使政策朝着更符合穷人偏好的方向发展,但在其他情况下,利益集团更倾向于富人,这就抵消了政策的影响。此外,利益集团与不太富裕的人的偏好更紧密结合的例子往往反映了特殊的情况——要么是利益集团通过“幸运的巧合”分享穷人的偏好,要么是美国退休人员协会的独特案例,它不能作为利益集团倡导弱势群体需求的一般模式。因此,对于那些寻求在制定政府政策时平衡不富裕的美国人的声音的改革者来说,利益集团似乎不太有希望。
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Interest Groups and Inequality in Democratic Responsiveness in the U.S.
In this paper, I examine the extent to which the link between public preferences and government policy is biased toward the preferences of high-income Americans. Using an original data set of almost 2,000 survey questions on proposed policy changes between 1981 and 2002, I find a moderately strong relationship between what the public wants and what the government does, albeit with a strong bias toward the status quo. But I also find that when Americans with different income levels differ in their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear little relationship to the preferences of poor or middle income Americans. After documenting these inequalities, I examine the role of interest groups in shaping policy responsiveness to the preferences of the public. I show that neither the direction of interest group alignments nor the extent of interest group engagement significantly alters the patters of policy responsiveness to Americans at different income levels. Interest groups do influence federal policy, but they do so independently of the preferences of the public. Affluent Americans are more likely to see their preferences reflected in policy outcomes if the balance of interest groups on an issue share those preferences, but the extent to which the affluent move policy in one direction or another is independent of the influence of interest groups. Interest groups do sometimes move policy in a direction more consistent with the preferences of the poor, but these are offset by other instances in which interest groups are more aligned with the affluent. Moreover, the instances on which interest groups align more closely with the preferences of the less well off often reflect idiosyncratic circumstances - either interest groups that share the preferences of the poor by "happy coincidence" or the unique case of the AARP which cannot serve as a general model of interest group advocacy for the needs of the less advantaged. Consequently, interest groups do not appear to hold much promise for reformers who seek to equalize the voice of less affluent Americans in shaping government policy.
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