Subsidies induce a market inefficiency by creating a deadweight loss since supply and demand are out of equilibrium. In 2016, electricity subsidies were the largest component of the total global energy subsides, with an estimated 128 billion USD out of 287 billion USD. Electricity generation is also directly responsible for a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions. Under baseline assumptions about supply and demand elasticities and employing the latest available data, we first estimate the welfare loss of global electricity subsidies and then estimate the global environmental costs imposed by electricity consumption. We find that the total annual deadweight loss worldwide in 2016 was 12.4 billion USD. Incorporating external costs stemming from excessive consumption, which is a result of prices that are less than the private marginal cost, leads to a total annual welfare loss of 43.2 billion USD. This number accounts for 4.5% of the total electricity market value in electricity-subsidizing countries. Furthermore, we estimate that the worldwide electricity consumption imposes environmental costs of at least 652.8 billion USD annually; thus, the total annual costs in the global electricity markets are nearly 700 billion USD.
{"title":"The Welfare Loss of Subsidies in Global Electricity Markets","authors":"Pierre-Olivier Pineau, Nima Rafizadeh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3679848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3679848","url":null,"abstract":"Subsidies induce a market inefficiency by creating a deadweight loss since supply and demand are out of equilibrium. In 2016, electricity subsidies were the largest component of the total global energy subsides, with an estimated 128 billion USD out of 287 billion USD. Electricity generation is also directly responsible for a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions. Under baseline assumptions about supply and demand elasticities and employing the latest available data, we first estimate the welfare loss of global electricity subsidies and then estimate the global environmental costs imposed by electricity consumption. We find that the total annual deadweight loss worldwide in 2016 was 12.4 billion USD. Incorporating external costs stemming from excessive consumption, which is a result of prices that are less than the private marginal cost, leads to a total annual welfare loss of 43.2 billion USD. This number accounts for 4.5% of the total electricity market value in electricity-subsidizing countries. Furthermore, we estimate that the worldwide electricity consumption imposes environmental costs of at least 652.8 billion USD annually; thus, the total annual costs in the global electricity markets are nearly 700 billion USD.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127481857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper exploits panel data from the Food Security Survey to examine varying transaction costs on SNAP benefit take-up by tracking individuals eligible for SNAP benefits. Using a logistic regression model, I find SNAP-eligible households living in states with relatively low transaction costs are more likely to take up SNAP benefits than similar households in high transaction cost states.
{"title":"SNAP Take-Up and Transaction Costs: An Analysis Using the Food Security Survey","authors":"Jon Murphy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3305961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3305961","url":null,"abstract":"This paper exploits panel data from the Food Security Survey to examine varying transaction costs on SNAP benefit take-up by tracking individuals eligible for SNAP benefits. Using a logistic regression model, I find SNAP-eligible households living in states with relatively low transaction costs are more likely to take up SNAP benefits than similar households in high transaction cost states.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133708186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Medicaid’s federal-state matching system of financing is the nation’s largest example of fiscal federalism. Using generous federal subsidies, the Affordable Care Act incentivized states to expand Medicaid, which became a state option in the aftermath of a 2012 Supreme Court ruling. As of early 2020, 14 states had not yet expanded, with concerns over state budgetary effects described as a key barrier. We use an event-study approach to analyze state budget data from 2010-2018 and assess the effects of state Medicaid expansion decisions. We find that Medicaid expansion increased total spending in expansion states by 6% to 9%, compared to non-expansion states. By source of funds, federal spending via the states increased by 10% in the first year of Medicaid expansion, rising to 27% in 2018. Changes in spending from state funding were modest and non-significant, with less than a 1% change from baseline annually in the most recent years, 2017 and 2018. Meanwhile, we find no evidence that increased Medicaid spending from expansion produced any reductions in spending on education, corrections, transportation, or public assistance. Changes in Medicaid spending tracked closely with the baseline pre-ACA (2013) uninsured rate in each states, with expansion leading to roughly $2680 in added annual spending per uninsured adult. As a result, we estimate states that didn’t expand Medicaid passed up $43 billion in federally-subsidized program funds in 2018. Finally, state projections in the aggregate were reasonably accurate, with expansion states projecting average Medicaid spending from 2014-2018 within 2 percent of the actual amounts, and in fact overestimating Medicaid spending in most years.
医疗补助的联邦-州配对融资体系是美国财政联邦制的最大范例。利用慷慨的联邦补贴，《平价医疗法案》(Affordable Care Act)激励各州扩大医疗补助计划(Medicaid)。在2012年最高法院(Supreme Court)的一项裁决之后，医疗补助成为了各州的选择。截至2020年初，有14个州尚未扩张，对州预算影响的担忧被认为是一个关键障碍。我们使用事件研究方法来分析2010-2018年的州预算数据，并评估州医疗补助扩张决策的影响。我们发现，与没有扩大医疗补助计划的州相比，扩大医疗补助计划的州的总支出增加了6%到9%。从资金来源来看，在医疗补助扩张的第一年，各州的联邦支出增长了10%，2018年上升到27%。国家资金支出的变化不大，也不显著，在最近几年、2017年和2018年，每年从基线变化不到1%。与此同时，我们没有发现任何证据表明，扩大医疗补助计划的支出增加会导致教育、矫正、交通或公共援助方面的支出减少。医疗补助支出的变化与aca实施前(2013年)各州未参保率的基线密切相关，扩张导致每个未参保成年人的年支出增加约2680美元。因此，我们估计，没有扩大医疗补助计划的州在2018年浪费了430亿美元的联邦补贴项目资金。最后，各州的总体预测相当准确，扩张州对2014-2018年平均医疗补助支出的预测在实际金额的2%以内，实际上在大多数年份都高估了医疗补助支出。
{"title":"Fiscal Federalism and the Budget Impacts of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid Expansion","authors":"J. Gruber, B. Sommers","doi":"10.3386/w26862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26862","url":null,"abstract":"Medicaid’s federal-state matching system of financing is the nation’s largest example of fiscal federalism. Using generous federal subsidies, the Affordable Care Act incentivized states to expand Medicaid, which became a state option in the aftermath of a 2012 Supreme Court ruling. As of early 2020, 14 states had not yet expanded, with concerns over state budgetary effects described as a key barrier. We use an event-study approach to analyze state budget data from 2010-2018 and assess the effects of state Medicaid expansion decisions. We find that Medicaid expansion increased total spending in expansion states by 6% to 9%, compared to non-expansion states. By source of funds, federal spending via the states increased by 10% in the first year of Medicaid expansion, rising to 27% in 2018. Changes in spending from state funding were modest and non-significant, with less than a 1% change from baseline annually in the most recent years, 2017 and 2018. Meanwhile, we find no evidence that increased Medicaid spending from expansion produced any reductions in spending on education, corrections, transportation, or public assistance. Changes in Medicaid spending tracked closely with the baseline pre-ACA (2013) uninsured rate in each states, with expansion leading to roughly $2680 in added annual spending per uninsured adult. As a result, we estimate states that didn’t expand Medicaid passed up $43 billion in federally-subsidized program funds in 2018. Finally, state projections in the aggregate were reasonably accurate, with expansion states projecting average Medicaid spending from 2014-2018 within 2 percent of the actual amounts, and in fact overestimating Medicaid spending in most years.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127121751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reformers often argue that the welfare benefits of ameliorating inequality are worth the cost in reduced economic efficiency that supposedly results from associated increases in government spending. This paper argues that these arguments are mostly misguided. Focusing solely on the marginal benefit of government- versus private-sector spending, there is ample reason to conclude that many governmental expenditures directed to reducing inequality are justifiable on the basis that they improve overall efficiency, even as they also reduce inequality. Because the efficiency argument directly addresses the concerns that otherwise animate restraint in redistributive programs, treating the reduction of inequality as a tradeoff against efficiency losses that is otherwise worthwhile is mostly counterproductive from a social policy perspective. Reformers instead should engage proponents of economic efficiency on their own terms.
In making this argument, the paper also develops the concept of “budget policy endogeneity,” or the idea that the affordability or not of various programs must take into account the allocative and distributional effects of current spending on future wealth, since revenue for current projects may be raised in the future. If current spending enhances allocative efficiency, programs that can only be funded with borrowing today create the conditions for their relatively less burdensome repayment tomorrow.
{"title":"Inequality and Spending Policy","authors":"D. Hasen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3538799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3538799","url":null,"abstract":"Reformers often argue that the welfare benefits of ameliorating inequality are worth the cost in reduced economic efficiency that supposedly results from associated increases in government spending. This paper argues that these arguments are mostly misguided. Focusing solely on the marginal benefit of government- versus private-sector spending, there is ample reason to conclude that many governmental expenditures directed to reducing inequality are justifiable on the basis that they improve overall efficiency, even as they also reduce inequality. Because the efficiency argument directly addresses the concerns that otherwise animate restraint in redistributive programs, treating the reduction of inequality as a tradeoff against efficiency losses that is otherwise worthwhile is mostly counterproductive from a social policy perspective. Reformers instead should engage proponents of economic efficiency on their own terms.<br><br>In making this argument, the paper also develops the concept of “budget policy endogeneity,” or the idea that the affordability or not of various programs must take into account the allocative and distributional effects of current spending on future wealth, since revenue for current projects may be raised in the future. If current spending enhances allocative efficiency, programs that can only be funded with borrowing today create the conditions for their relatively less burdensome repayment tomorrow.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129009258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Income redistribution and insurance are core functions of welfare states. What role should the EU play in this domain? I examine the purchase of normative theorizing on social justice on this question, building on the contrast between three models of EU involvement: the EU as Support, which implies the sharing of resources through intergovernmental transfers; the EU as Provider, which implies EU cross-border transfers towards individual citizens; the EU as Guide or Guarantor, which implies that the EU formulates normative policy ideals. I review different normative accounts of justice for the EU (Ronzoni, Viehoff, Sangiovanni, Van Parijs), and how they bear on the choice between these models of EU involvement in welfare state solidarity. These accounts evolve between two extreme positions. On the one hand, an account based on supranational justice as ‘background justice for nation states’ implies that the EU should be a mere instrument in the hands of its member states. The opposite extreme position is that EU should be a laboratory for international distributive justice, whereby national welfare states are demoted to the toolbox of instruments. I argue that an account of justice for the EU must search for a middle ground, whereby neither the national welfare states nor the EU are demoted to mere instruments. I conclude that the EU should support the member states’ welfare states in some of their key functions, on the basis of common social standards and in pursuit of upward convergence. Such a ‘Social Union’ would be a Support, Guide and Guarantor, both in the realm of insurance and redistribution. Through the establishment of interstate insurance, it would be a true ‘insurance union’, but, from the point of view of individual citizens, it would not become a direct Provider of insurance. It would engage in interstate redistribution, but not in interpersonal cross-border redistribution.
收入再分配和保险是福利国家的核心功能。欧盟在这一领域应该扮演什么角色?在欧盟参与的三种模式的对比基础上，我考察了关于这个问题的社会正义的规范性理论的购买:欧盟作为支持，这意味着通过政府间转移共享资源;欧盟作为提供者，这意味着欧盟向公民个人进行跨境转移;欧盟作为指南或担保人，这意味着欧盟制定规范性的政策理想。我回顾了欧盟正义的不同规范解释(Ronzoni, Viehoff, Sangiovanni, Van Parijs)，以及它们如何影响欧盟参与福利国家团结的这些模式之间的选择。这些说法在两种极端立场之间演变。一方面，基于超国家正义作为“民族国家的背景正义”的解释意味着欧盟应该仅仅是其成员国手中的工具。相反的极端立场是，欧盟应该成为国际分配正义的实验室，国家福利国家应该被降格为工具工具箱。我认为，对欧盟正义的解释必须寻找一个中间立场，在这个中间立场上，国家福利国家和欧盟都不会被贬为纯粹的工具。我的结论是，欧盟应该在共同社会标准和追求向上趋同的基础上，支持成员国福利国家的一些关键职能。这样一个“社会联盟”将在保险和再分配领域起到支持、指导和保证的作用。通过建立州际保险，它将成为一个真正的“保险联盟”，但从公民个人的角度来看，它不会成为一个直接的保险提供者。它会参与州际再分配，但不会参与人际间的跨境再分配。
{"title":"Solidarity through Redistribution and Insurance of Incomes: The EU As Support, Guide, Guarantor or Provider?","authors":"Frank Vandenbroucke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3530876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530876","url":null,"abstract":"Income redistribution and insurance are core functions of welfare states. What role should the EU play in this domain? I examine the purchase of normative theorizing on social justice on this question, building on the contrast between three models of EU involvement: the EU as Support, which implies the sharing of resources through intergovernmental transfers; the EU as Provider, which implies EU cross-border transfers towards individual citizens; the EU as Guide or Guarantor, which implies that the EU formulates normative policy ideals. \u0000 \u0000I review different normative accounts of justice for the EU (Ronzoni, Viehoff, Sangiovanni, Van Parijs), and how they bear on the choice between these models of EU involvement in welfare state solidarity. These accounts evolve between two extreme positions. On the one hand, an account based on supranational justice as ‘background justice for nation states’ implies that the EU should be a mere instrument in the hands of its member states. The opposite extreme position is that EU should be a laboratory for international distributive justice, whereby national welfare states are demoted to the toolbox of instruments. I argue that an account of justice for the EU must search for a middle ground, whereby neither the national welfare states nor the EU are demoted to mere instruments. \u0000 \u0000I conclude that the EU should support the member states’ welfare states in some of their key functions, on the basis of common social standards and in pursuit of upward convergence. Such a ‘Social Union’ would be a Support, Guide and Guarantor, both in the realm of insurance and redistribution. Through the establishment of interstate insurance, it would be a true ‘insurance union’, but, from the point of view of individual citizens, it would not become a direct Provider of insurance. It would engage in interstate redistribution, but not in interpersonal cross-border redistribution.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130795201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David N. Figlio, Cassandra M. D. Hart, Krzysztof Karbownik
Using a rich dataset that merges student-level school records with birth records, and a student fixed effect design, we explore how the massive scale-up of a Florida private school choice program affected public school students’ outcomes. Expansion of the program produced modestly larger benefits for students attending public schools that had a larger initial degree of private school options, measured prior to the introduction of the voucher program. These benefits include higher standardized test scores and lower absenteeism and suspension rates. Effects are particularly pronounced for lower-income students, but results are positive for more affluent students as well.
{"title":"Effects of Scaling Up Private School Choice Programs on Public School Students","authors":"David N. Figlio, Cassandra M. D. Hart, Krzysztof Karbownik","doi":"10.3386/w26758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26758","url":null,"abstract":"Using a rich dataset that merges student-level school records with birth records, and a student fixed effect design, we explore how the massive scale-up of a Florida private school choice program affected public school students’ outcomes. Expansion of the program produced modestly larger benefits for students attending public schools that had a larger initial degree of private school options, measured prior to the introduction of the voucher program. These benefits include higher standardized test scores and lower absenteeism and suspension rates. Effects are particularly pronounced for lower-income students, but results are positive for more affluent students as well.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114325332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What theory can help us to explain the expansion of social assistance in low and middle income countries? Prevailing theories of welfare institutions, including power resources and varieties of capitalism, were developed to study the welfare institutions that emerged among early industrialisers. The paper revisits these theories with a view to identifying elements of general applicability to the study of emerging social assistance in late industrialisers. Two hypotheses on the growth of social assistance are tested using panel data for 2000-2015 and a within-between mixed estimation model. The results suggest a general theory of welfare institutions is capable of throwing light on emergent welfare institutions in low and middle income countries, while highlighting important gaps.
{"title":"Does a General Theory of Welfare Institutions Explain the Expansion of Social Assistance in Low and Middle Income Countries?","authors":"A. Barrientos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3652255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3652255","url":null,"abstract":"What theory can help us to explain the expansion of social assistance in low and middle income countries? Prevailing theories of welfare institutions, including power resources and varieties of capitalism, were developed to study the welfare institutions that emerged among early industrialisers. The paper revisits these theories with a view to identifying elements of general applicability to the study of emerging social assistance in late industrialisers. Two hypotheses on the growth of social assistance are tested using panel data for 2000-2015 and a within-between mixed estimation model. The results suggest a general theory of welfare institutions is capable of throwing light on emergent welfare institutions in low and middle income countries, while highlighting important gaps.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114096386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Small Area Fair Market Rents is an important reform of HUD's Housing Choice Voucher Program. One argument for them is that they would reduce overpayment for voucher units in low-rent neighborhoods. This leads to the belief that the benefits of SAFMRs can be funded largely by reductions in landlord profits rather than by losses to voucher recipients who remain in low-rent areas. The usual theoretical argument that has led many to believe that voucher units are overpriced focuses on one implication of one feature of the Housing Choice Voucher program. This article provides a more comprehensive theoretical analysis that leads to the conclusion that the worst voucher units and those in the worst neighborhoods will usually rent for more than the mean market rent of identical units, and the best units in the best neighborhoods will rent for less than this amount. The debate over this matter has ignored the bulk of the available evidence. This article summarizes and assesses the data, methods, and results of the major studies. The evidence is consistent with the general pattern predicted by the comprehensive theoretical analysis but also with an alternative explanation that challenges its interpretation as overpayments and underpayments for voucher units. The mix of units with estimated overpayments and underpayments varies across studies, but the weight of the evidence is that the aggregate differences are modest. Finally, the evidence available indicates that SAFMRs will decrease the rents paid for voucher units with any specified set of characteristics in the worst neighborhoods and will increase the rents of such units in the best neighborhoods.
{"title":"Does HUD Overpay for Voucher Units, and Will SAFMRs Reduce the Overpayment?","authors":"E. Olsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3427803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3427803","url":null,"abstract":"Small Area Fair Market Rents is an important reform of HUD's Housing Choice Voucher Program. One argument for them is that they would reduce overpayment for voucher units in low-rent neighborhoods. This leads to the belief that the benefits of SAFMRs can be funded largely by reductions in landlord profits rather than by losses to voucher recipients who remain in low-rent areas. The usual theoretical argument that has led many to believe that voucher units are overpriced focuses on one implication of one feature of the Housing Choice Voucher program. This article provides a more comprehensive theoretical analysis that leads to the conclusion that the worst voucher units and those in the worst neighborhoods will usually rent for more than the mean market rent of identical units, and the best units in the best neighborhoods will rent for less than this amount. The debate over this matter has ignored the bulk of the available evidence. This article summarizes and assesses the data, methods, and results of the major studies. The evidence is consistent with the general pattern predicted by the comprehensive theoretical analysis but also with an alternative explanation that challenges its interpretation as overpayments and underpayments for voucher units. The mix of units with estimated overpayments and underpayments varies across studies, but the weight of the evidence is that the aggregate differences are modest. Finally, the evidence available indicates that SAFMRs will decrease the rents paid for voucher units with any specified set of characteristics in the worst neighborhoods and will increase the rents of such units in the best neighborhoods.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134355515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a strong intergenerational correlation in welfare participation, but this does not imply that parental welfare receipt induces child receipt. While there are a few quasi-experimental studies that provide estimates of the causal effect of parental welfare participation for children from marginal welfare participants, we know very little about intergenerational spillovers of welfare participation onto the children of average welfare participants. By combining rich administrative data from Norway with weak mean-monotonicity assumptions, we estimate nonparametric bounds around the average causal effect of parental welfare participation on children’s welfare participation in the general population, as well as the average causal effect for children growing up in welfare-dependent families. We find that these average causal effects are considerably lower than the intergenerational correlation in welfare participation, and substantially below available local average treatment effect estimates in the literatu . We further find important differences between intergenerational spillovers of disability insurance and intergenerational spillovers of financial assistance, a traditional means-tested welfare program.
{"title":"The Intergenerational Transmission of Welfare Dependency","authors":"Monique de Haan, R. Schreiner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3237303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3237303","url":null,"abstract":"There is a strong intergenerational correlation in welfare participation, but this does not imply that parental welfare receipt induces child receipt. While there are a few quasi-experimental studies that provide estimates of the causal effect of parental welfare participation for children from marginal welfare participants, we know very little about intergenerational spillovers of welfare participation onto the children of average welfare participants. By combining rich administrative data from Norway with weak mean-monotonicity assumptions, we estimate nonparametric bounds around the average causal effect of parental welfare participation on children’s welfare participation in the general population, as well as the average causal effect for children growing up in welfare-dependent families. We find that these average causal effects are considerably lower than the intergenerational correlation in welfare participation, and substantially below available local average treatment effect estimates in the literatu . We further find important differences between intergenerational spillovers of disability insurance and intergenerational spillovers of financial assistance, a traditional means-tested welfare program.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128968600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the impact of childcare provision on cases of child abuse and neglect in Germany between 2002 and 2014. For identification, we exploit a governmental reform introducing mandatory early child care. The implementation at the county level generated large temporal and spatial variation in childcare coverage. Our measure of child abuse and neglect comes from a unique high-quality administrative data set that covers all child protection cases at the German county level. The estimated ITT effect shows a decline by 0.24 cases per 1,000 children if a county increases childcare slots above the median, which is a reduction of 21.4 percent from the mean. This finding is of high economic relevance given the enormous costs of child abuse and neglect for the society. Our results show that the provision of universal public child care can be an effective policy to prevent part of these costs.
{"title":"The Effects of Universal Public Childcare Provision on Cases of Child Neglect and Abuse","authors":"Malte Sandner, Stephan L. Thomsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3234210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3234210","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of childcare provision on cases of child abuse and neglect in Germany between 2002 and 2014. For identification, we exploit a governmental reform introducing mandatory early child care. The implementation at the county level generated large temporal and spatial variation in childcare coverage. Our measure of child abuse and neglect comes from a unique high-quality administrative data set that covers all child protection cases at the German county level. The estimated ITT effect shows a decline by 0.24 cases per 1,000 children if a county increases childcare slots above the median, which is a reduction of 21.4 percent from the mean. This finding is of high economic relevance given the enormous costs of child abuse and neglect for the society. Our results show that the provision of universal public child care can be an effective policy to prevent part of these costs.","PeriodicalId":196905,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Expenditures & Welfare Programs (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127608912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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