{"title":"服务商和抵押贷款支持证券违约:理论和证据","authors":"B. Ambrose, A. Sanders, Abdullah Yavas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1789695","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study conflicting incentives of the master and special servicers in handling troubled loans in a CMBS deal and how the frictions between the interests of the two servicers might be diminished if the master and special servicing rights are held by the same firm. We show that concentrating both servicing rights in one firm reduces the likelihood that a defaulted loan terminates in foreclosure.","PeriodicalId":142280,"journal":{"name":"George Mason University School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"191 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default: Theory and Evidence\",\"authors\":\"B. Ambrose, A. Sanders, Abdullah Yavas\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1789695\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study conflicting incentives of the master and special servicers in handling troubled loans in a CMBS deal and how the frictions between the interests of the two servicers might be diminished if the master and special servicing rights are held by the same firm. We show that concentrating both servicing rights in one firm reduces the likelihood that a defaulted loan terminates in foreclosure.\",\"PeriodicalId\":142280,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"George Mason University School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"191 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-12-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"George Mason University School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1789695\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"George Mason University School of Business Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1789695","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default: Theory and Evidence
We study conflicting incentives of the master and special servicers in handling troubled loans in a CMBS deal and how the frictions between the interests of the two servicers might be diminished if the master and special servicing rights are held by the same firm. We show that concentrating both servicing rights in one firm reduces the likelihood that a defaulted loan terminates in foreclosure.
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