超越赤裸裸的排斥:登士普之后的独家交易

Robert B. Kulick
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引用次数: 0

摘要

尽管许多人开始将预测主导企业战略行为的反竞争后果的模型集视为“后芝加哥”革命,但典型的后芝加哥“裸排斥”排他交易理论维持了芝加哥的基本结构,其中排他交易被建模为契约驱动的交换条件。然而,在极具影响力的U.S. v. Dentsply案中,第三巡回法院从歧视性拒绝交易的角度分析了排他性交易,买方没有获得排他性赔偿。本文发展了一个与Dentsply和许多其他主要反垄断案件相一致的排他性交易模式。
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Beyond Naked Exclusion: Exclusive Dealing after Dentsply
Although many have come to regard the collection of models that predict anticompetitive consequences from strategic conduct by dominant firms as a “post-Chicago” revolution, the canonical post-Chicago “Naked Exclusion” theory of exclusive dealing maintains the fundamental Chicago structure where exclusive dealing is modeled as a contract driven quid pro quo. However, in the highly influential case U.S. v. Dentsply, the Third Circuit analyzed exclusive dealing in terms of a discriminatory refusal to deal where buyers received no compensation for exclusivity. This article develops a model of exclusive dealing consistent with Dentsply and many other major antitrust cases.
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