{"title":"分离和平等主义价值观下的平等损失","authors":"Zhengxing Zou, R. van den Brink","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3655072","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Equal Loss under Separatorization and Egalitarian Values\",\"authors\":\"Zhengxing Zou, R. van den Brink\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3655072\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.\",\"PeriodicalId\":365118,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-07-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3655072\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3655072","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
我们刻画了分离条件下相等损失的tu -对策的相等分割值、相等剩余分割值以及它们的仿射组合类。这一公理要求，如果一名玩家变成了“侏儒玩家”(Casajus and Huettner, 2014)，那么其他任何两名玩家都会受到同样的影响。
Equal Loss under Separatorization and Egalitarian Values
We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.
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