巴苏的建议:罚款影响贿赂

ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-08-08 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2783262

Sergey V Popov

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我提供了一个模型，将贿赂金额与对行贿者和行贿者施加的罚款联系起来。我证明Basu(2011)提出的不惩罚行贿者以诱导检举的建议并不一定有助于降低贿赂。对行贿者处以更高的罚款会使他们要求更多的贿赂，而降低对行贿者的罚款可能会增加他们行贿的意愿。透明度的提高，如果实现，有效地同时增加了这两项罚款。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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On Basu's Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes

I provide a model that connects the bribe amount with the fines imposed on both bribe-taker and bribe-payer. I show that the proposal of Basu (2011) to not punish bribe-payers to induce whistleblowing does not have to help lower bribes. Higher fines on bribe-takers will make them ask for larger bribes, whereas lowering fines for bribe-paying on bribe-payers might increase their willingness to pay the bribe. An increase in transparency, if achieved, effectively increases both fines simultaneously.

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ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)

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