模仿支配与排斥经济学:公共情境下的私人物品

A. Imas, Kristóf Madarász
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引用次数: 4

摘要

我们提出一个简单的模拟机制主导地位,一个人的估值为消费对象或者是拥有一个属性是增加别人的未满足的欲望。这种模仿偏好有助于解释大量的市场异常现象,并在各种领域产生新的预测。在双边交换中,人们表现出社会禀赋效应,对相对稀缺的商品的需求增加。典型的垄断收入超额利润通过随机扣除一些人无法购买该产品。我们在几个交换环境中对模型的预测进行了经验测试。当拍卖一件私人物品时,我们发现,随机地将人们排除在竞标机会之外,会大大提高那些保留这一选择权的人的平均出价。此外,排斥比通过包容增加竞争带来更大的预期收入。当投标者知道那些被排除在外的人对商品的欲望较低时,这种效应就不存在了。我们证明,模仿偏好甚至对基本交换也有影响:当其他人被明确排除在购买同一种商品的机会之外时,一个人对某种商品的需求会大幅增加。模仿偏好对基于价格和非价格的排斥方法都有影响:该模型预测了凡勃伦效应,使反对再分配和贸易的态度合理化,并为社会分层和歧视提供了新的动机。
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Mimetic Dominance and the Economics of Exclusion: Private Goods in Public Contexts
We propose a simple mechanism of mimetic dominance whereby a person’s valuation for consuming an object or possessing an attribute is increasing in others’ unmet desire for it. Such mimetic preferences help explain a host of market anomalies and generate novel predictions in a variety of domains. In bilateral exchange, people exhibit a social endowment effect, and there is an increased demand for goods that become relatively more scarce. A classic monopolist earns excess profit by randomly excluding some people from being able to purchase the product. We test the predictions of the model empirically across several exchange environments. When auctioning a private good, we find that randomly excluding people from the opportunity to bid substantially increases average bids amongst those who retain this option. Furthermore, exclusion leads to greater expected revenue than increasing competition through inclusion. This effect is absent when bidders know that those who are excluded have lower desires for the good. We demonstrate that mimetic preferences matter even for basic exchange: a person’s demand for a good increases substantially when others are explicitly excluded from the opportunity to buy the same kind of good. Mimetic preferences have implications for both price and non-price based methods of exclusion: the model predicts Veblen effects, rationalizes attitudes against redistribution and trade, and provides a novel motive for social stratification and discrimination.
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