通过与事业相关的营销进行价格歧视

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-05-05 DOI:10.1111/jems.12478
Kameshwari Shankar, Suman Ghosh
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引用次数: 0

摘要

企业社会责任(CSR)的一种常见形式是同意将私人商品收入的固定部分捐赠给慈善事业。在本文中,我们探讨了这种企业社会责任的一个新的基本原理,通常被称为原因相关营销(CRM)。我们认为,将私人物品购买与慈善捐赠与合作的非政府组织(NGO)联系起来,允许公司在希望从收入中进行慈善捐赠的利他消费者和不认为此类捐赠有任何价值的非利他消费者之间进行价格歧视。利他倾向的差异转化为私人商品价值的差异,从而限制了企业在私人商品市场中提取消费者剩余的能力。将私人物品销售与慈善事业联系起来,可以降低私人物品价值的变化,使企业能够获得更大的盈余。同时,通过诱导非利他的消费者通过购买与慈善相关的商品进行捐赠,客户关系管理还可能增加对非政府组织的慈善捐赠,超出标准自愿捐赠均衡下所能达到的水平。我们扩展了我们的模型,考虑客户关系管理对利润和捐赠的影响,当无私的消费者可以选择从他们的收入中直接捐赠给非政府组织,或者通过购买慈善相关商品进行捐赠时。我们在客户关系管理广告的背景下考虑这一选择,在这种情况下,公司将消费者的利他主义公布于众,从而为通过慈善相关商品进行的捐赠提供展示价值。我们发现,当我们允许公司通过广告来适当利用展览效用,同时通过直接捐赠和客户关系管理为非政府组织提供更多捐赠时,客户关系管理的案例就会得到加强。
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Price discrimination through cause-related marketing

A common form of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by firms is to agree to donate a fixed portion of private good revenues to a charitable cause. In this paper, we explore a new rationale for such CSR known commonly as Cause-Related Marketing (CRM). We argue that linking private good purchase with charitable donations to a partnering nongovernmental organization (NGO) allows the firm to price discriminate between altruistic consumers who wish to make charitable donations out of their income and nonaltruistic consumers who do not place any value on such donations. The disparity in altruistic propensities translates into a difference in private good value which limits the firm's ability to extract consumer surplus in the private good market. Linking private good sales to charity brings down the variation in private good value and enables the firm to appropriate greater surplus. At the same time, by inducing nonaltruistic consumers to donate through their purchase of the charity-linked good, CRM may also increase charitable donations to the NGO beyond the level that would be achieved under the standard voluntary contributions equilibrium. We extend our model to consider the effects of CRM on profits and donations when altruistic consumers can choose between donating directly to the NGO out of their income and donating through their purchase of the charity-linked good. We consider this choice in the context of CRM advertising where firms make the altruism of their consumers public and thus provide exhibition value to donations made through the charity-linked good. We find that the case for CRM strengthens when we allow the firm to appropriate exhibition utility through advertising while enabling greater donations for the NGO through direct donations as well as CRM.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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