{"title":"两极多候选人选举与腐败","authors":"R. Myerson","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single-winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"15","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption\",\"authors\":\"R. Myerson\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single-winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.\",\"PeriodicalId\":367470,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Political Economy (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"133 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2006-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"15\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Political Economy (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Economy (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single-winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.
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