This article analyzes whether political connections of the board of directors of publicly traded companies in the USA affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. It focuses on the change in control of both House and Senate following the 1994 election and finds that companies with boards connected to the winning (losing) party experience a significant and large increase (decrease) in procurement contracts after the election. The results remain significant after controlling for industry classifications as well as for several other company characteristics. The findings highlight one of the main avenues through which corporate political connections add value to US companies. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.
{"title":"Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts","authors":"E. Goldman, Jongil So, Jörg Rocholl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.965888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.965888","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes whether political connections of the board of directors of publicly traded companies in the USA affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. It focuses on the change in control of both House and Senate following the 1994 election and finds that companies with boards connected to the winning (losing) party experience a significant and large increase (decrease) in procurement contracts after the election. The results remain significant after controlling for industry classifications as well as for several other company characteristics. The findings highlight one of the main avenues through which corporate political connections add value to US companies. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115478770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
If voter preferences depend on a noisy state variable, under what conditions do large elections deliver outcomes "as if" the state were common knowledge? While the existing literature models elections using the jury metaphor where a change in information regarding the state induces voters to switch in favour of only one alternative, I allow for more general preferences where a change in information can induce switch in favour of either alternative. I show that information is aggregated for any voting rule if and only if the probability of switch in favour one alternative is strictly greater than the probability of switch away from that alternative for any change in information. In other words, unless preferences closely conform to the jury metaphor, for large classes of voting rules, there are equilibria that produce outcomes different from the full information outcome with high probability. This condition is very fragile and may be easily violated in spatial elections if the policy space is multidimensional. I conclude that state-contingent conflict in voter preferences may often lead to failure of information aggregation.
{"title":"Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections","authors":"Sourav Bhattacharya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.912945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.912945","url":null,"abstract":"If voter preferences depend on a noisy state variable, under what conditions do large elections deliver outcomes \"as if\" the state were common knowledge? While the existing literature models elections using the jury metaphor where a change in information regarding the state induces voters to switch in favour of only one alternative, I allow for more general preferences where a change in information can induce switch in favour of either alternative. I show that information is aggregated for any voting rule if and only if the probability of switch in favour one alternative is strictly greater than the probability of switch away from that alternative for any change in information. In other words, unless preferences closely conform to the jury metaphor, for large classes of voting rules, there are equilibria that produce outcomes different from the full information outcome with high probability. This condition is very fragile and may be easily violated in spatial elections if the policy space is multidimensional. I conclude that state-contingent conflict in voter preferences may often lead to failure of information aggregation.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123900147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, the American market system has come under increasing criticism from those it serves. Many young people, radicals, members of minority groups and even middle-of-the-roaders are concerned about such things as poor product quality, poor variety, unsafe products. and misleading advertising. From almost any vantage point, flaws in the American economic system are visible.
{"title":"Role Conflict: Society's Dilemma with Excellence in Marketing","authors":"J. Armstrong","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1181644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1181644","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, the American market system has come under increasing criticism from those it serves. Many young people, radicals, members of minority groups and even middle-of-the-roaders are concerned about such things as poor product quality, poor variety, unsafe products. and misleading advertising. From almost any vantage point, flaws in the American economic system are visible.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132244996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A powerful historical pathway of structural transformation is experienced by all successful developing countries, and this Working Paper presents the results of new empirical analysis of the process. Making sure the poor are connected to both the structural transformation and to the policy initiatives designed to ameliorate the distributional consequences of rapid transformation has turned out to be a major challenge for policy makers over the past half century. There are successes and failures, and the historical record illuminates what works and what does not. Trying to stop the structural transformation does not work, at least for the poor, and in fact can lead to prolonged immiseration. Investing in the capacity of the poor to cope with change and to participate in its benefits through better education and health does seem to work. Such investments typically require significant public sector resources and policy support, and thus depend on political processes that are themselves conditioned by the pressures generated by the structural transformation itself.
{"title":"The Structural Transformation as a Pathway Out of Poverty: Analytics, Empirics and Politics","authors":"C. Timmer, Selvin Akkus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1213154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1213154","url":null,"abstract":"A powerful historical pathway of structural transformation is experienced by all successful developing countries, and this Working Paper presents the results of new empirical analysis of the process. Making sure the poor are connected to both the structural transformation and to the policy initiatives designed to ameliorate the distributional consequences of rapid transformation has turned out to be a major challenge for policy makers over the past half century. There are successes and failures, and the historical record illuminates what works and what does not. Trying to stop the structural transformation does not work, at least for the poor, and in fact can lead to prolonged immiseration. Investing in the capacity of the poor to cope with change and to participate in its benefits through better education and health does seem to work. Such investments typically require significant public sector resources and policy support, and thus depend on political processes that are themselves conditioned by the pressures generated by the structural transformation itself.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129785126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, academic economists have come to appreciate the centrality of public institutions in contributing to economic performance. Yet Korea, arguably the premier success story of the last half-century, has sometimes been described as a First World economy with Third World institutions. Although Korea modestly underachieves on most of the 52 institutional indicators examined in this paper, it is not an outlier, and on most indicators it is converging on global norms from below. The patterns on specific indicators suggest that global institutions play some role as an external policy anchor. The reason is straightforward: The existence of international norms gives policymakers a goal to aim for, and the existence of international institutions (and other avenues of international diplomatic pressure) helps in overcoming the historical weakness and parochialism of Korean public institutions.
{"title":"Korean Institutional Reform in Comparative Perspective","authors":"M. Noland, E. Weeks","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1143524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1143524","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, academic economists have come to appreciate the centrality of public institutions in contributing to economic performance. Yet Korea, arguably the premier success story of the last half-century, has sometimes been described as a First World economy with Third World institutions. Although Korea modestly underachieves on most of the 52 institutional indicators examined in this paper, it is not an outlier, and on most indicators it is converging on global norms from below. The patterns on specific indicators suggest that global institutions play some role as an external policy anchor. The reason is straightforward: The existence of international norms gives policymakers a goal to aim for, and the existence of international institutions (and other avenues of international diplomatic pressure) helps in overcoming the historical weakness and parochialism of Korean public institutions.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114198011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the effect of social learning on political outcomes in a model of informative campaign advertising. Voters' communication network affects parties' incentives to disclose political information, voters' learning about candidates running for office, and polarization of the electoral outcome. In richer communication networks, parties disclose less political information and voters are more likely to possess erroneous beliefs about the characteristics of the candidates. In turn, a richer communication network among voters may lead to political polarization. These results are reinforced when interpersonal communication occurs more frequently among ideologically homogeneous individuals and parties can target political advertising.(JEL D72, D85, M37, Z13)
{"title":"'Personal Influence': Social Context and Political Competition","authors":"A. Galeotti, A. Mattozzi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1057681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1057681","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effect of social learning on political outcomes in a model of informative campaign advertising. Voters' communication network affects parties' incentives to disclose political information, voters' learning about candidates running for office, and polarization of the electoral outcome. In richer communication networks, parties disclose less political information and voters are more likely to possess erroneous beliefs about the characteristics of the candidates. In turn, a richer communication network among voters may lead to political polarization. These results are reinforced when interpersonal communication occurs more frequently among ideologically homogeneous individuals and parties can target political advertising.(JEL D72, D85, M37, Z13)","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122362344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the net impacts of college football games on the sales tax revenues and taxable sales of four mid-sized cities in Texas. The paper addresses the question in the title, but also asks whether state policy makers might be justified in encouraging schools in their state to play one another based on the local economic impact those games will have. In general, our evidence suggests the answer to that question is no.
{"title":"Do College Football Games Pay for Themselves? The Impact of College Football Games on Local Sales Tax Revenue","authors":"D. Coates, C. Depken","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1140271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1140271","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the net impacts of college football games on the sales tax revenues and taxable sales of four mid-sized cities in Texas. The paper addresses the question in the title, but also asks whether state policy makers might be justified in encouraging schools in their state to play one another based on the local economic impact those games will have. In general, our evidence suggests the answer to that question is no.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124734458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies, and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones. Are these regulations desirable? This paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry. In the absence of entry, contribution caps improve welfare by "leveling the political playing field". With entry, however, a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise, resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions. In particular, a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo; and even if better policies are chosen, the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs. Regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups, creating costly rent-seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying.
{"title":"Campaign Finance Regulation with Competing Interest Groups","authors":"Gergely Ujhelyi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1124084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1124084","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies, and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones. Are these regulations desirable? This paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry. In the absence of entry, contribution caps improve welfare by \"leveling the political playing field\". With entry, however, a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise, resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions. In particular, a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo; and even if better policies are chosen, the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs. Regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups, creating costly rent-seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"142 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134065848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After the 2001 crisis, Argentina - once the poster-child for pro-market structural-adjustment policies - had to define a new strategy in order to manage the societal demands that had led to the fall of the previous administration. The demand by the majority of the population for employment recovery spurred the government to introduce a massive employment program, the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (Program for Unemployed Male and Female Heads of Households). This program, which accounted for less than 1 percent of GDP at the outset, paved the way for a reduction of the contractionary effects that otherwise would have caused a catastrophic devaluation of the currency. This paper explores how Argentina pursued a strategy of employment generation, with the state participating as employer of last resort, to recover from one of the worst social and economic crises in its history.
{"title":"Argentina: A Case Study on the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados, or the Employment Road to Economic Recovery","authors":"D. Kostzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1132772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1132772","url":null,"abstract":"After the 2001 crisis, Argentina - once the poster-child for pro-market structural-adjustment policies - had to define a new strategy in order to manage the societal demands that had led to the fall of the previous administration. The demand by the majority of the population for employment recovery spurred the government to introduce a massive employment program, the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (Program for Unemployed Male and Female Heads of Households). This program, which accounted for less than 1 percent of GDP at the outset, paved the way for a reduction of the contractionary effects that otherwise would have caused a catastrophic devaluation of the currency. This paper explores how Argentina pursued a strategy of employment generation, with the state participating as employer of last resort, to recover from one of the worst social and economic crises in its history.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131569397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The breadth of takings scholarship has left useful ideas diluted amongst an ocean of theories. This article addresses that problem by creating a clear and useful taxonomy for takings constraints by which takings theories can be categorized and analyzed. These new categories are (1) compensatory restraints on how much government must compensate property owners, (2) categorical constraints which absolutely limit which property can be taken and for what purposes, and (3) processes constraints which limit how property is condemned. Furthermore, this article suggests that compensatory restraints are appropriate to minimize economic harms, and categorical constraints are only appropriate to minimize the destruction of property owners' autonomy. This new theory is only possible with the use of the new taxonomy to describe takings constraints. This paper does not attempt to argue which interests of property should be protected - a topic already developed in the scholarship. However, its new theory provides a framework for policymakers to apply when deciding what takings constraints to use when seeking to advance their substantive values in property, whatever those values may be.
{"title":"Takings Constraints: Mechanisms to Minimize the Uncompensated Increment and Limit the Government's Power to Take Property","authors":"Colin Parent","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1131795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1131795","url":null,"abstract":"The breadth of takings scholarship has left useful ideas diluted amongst an ocean of theories. This article addresses that problem by creating a clear and useful taxonomy for takings constraints by which takings theories can be categorized and analyzed. These new categories are (1) compensatory restraints on how much government must compensate property owners, (2) categorical constraints which absolutely limit which property can be taken and for what purposes, and (3) processes constraints which limit how property is condemned. Furthermore, this article suggests that compensatory restraints are appropriate to minimize economic harms, and categorical constraints are only appropriate to minimize the destruction of property owners' autonomy. This new theory is only possible with the use of the new taxonomy to describe takings constraints. This paper does not attempt to argue which interests of property should be protected - a topic already developed in the scholarship. However, its new theory provides a framework for policymakers to apply when deciding what takings constraints to use when seeking to advance their substantive values in property, whatever those values may be.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128848030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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