{"title":"电力市场中的虚假数据注入攻击","authors":"Le Xie, Yilin Mo, B. Sinopoli","doi":"10.1109/SMARTGRID.2010.5622048","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We present a potential class of cyber attack, named false data injection attack, against the state estimation in deregulated electricity markets. With the knowledge of the system configuration, we show that such attacks will circumvent the bad data measurement detection equipped in present SCADA systems, and lead to profitable financial misconduct such as virtual bidding the ex-post locational marginal price (LMP). We demonstrate the potential attacks on an IEEE 14-bus system.","PeriodicalId":106908,"journal":{"name":"2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"383","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"False Data Injection Attacks in Electricity Markets\",\"authors\":\"Le Xie, Yilin Mo, B. Sinopoli\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SMARTGRID.2010.5622048\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We present a potential class of cyber attack, named false data injection attack, against the state estimation in deregulated electricity markets. With the knowledge of the system configuration, we show that such attacks will circumvent the bad data measurement detection equipped in present SCADA systems, and lead to profitable financial misconduct such as virtual bidding the ex-post locational marginal price (LMP). We demonstrate the potential attacks on an IEEE 14-bus system.\",\"PeriodicalId\":106908,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-11-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"383\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SMARTGRID.2010.5622048\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SMARTGRID.2010.5622048","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
False Data Injection Attacks in Electricity Markets
We present a potential class of cyber attack, named false data injection attack, against the state estimation in deregulated electricity markets. With the knowledge of the system configuration, we show that such attacks will circumvent the bad data measurement detection equipped in present SCADA systems, and lead to profitable financial misconduct such as virtual bidding the ex-post locational marginal price (LMP). We demonstrate the potential attacks on an IEEE 14-bus system.