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摘要

从中世纪到工业革命,行会统治着欧洲的许多手工业和贸易。每个行会对其职业的进入都有规定,要求任何从业者成为行会成员,然后限制进入行会。行会为其成员的产品干预市场,努力保持高价格,限制产量,抑制竞争,并阻止可能破坏现状的创新。行会还在投入市场中发挥作用,试图控制原材料的获取,保持低工资,阻碍雇主争夺工人,阻止工人争取更好的工作条件。行会对女性的待遇尤为苛刻,通常不让她们当学徒,除了行会成员的遗孀之外,禁止任何女性经营车间。行会投入大量资金游说政府和政治精英,以授予、维持和扩大这些特权。行会有可能通过创造抵消性利益来补偿他们的卡特尔活动。协会质量认证是解决生产者和消费者之间信息不对称的一个可能的解决方案,它可以使市场更好地运作。行会学徒制有可能解决技能培训市场的缺陷,从而鼓励人力资本投资。从理论上讲,公会产生的卡特尔利润可以鼓励技术创新,使公会的主人能够从他们的创新中获得更多的社会利益,而公会的旅行和空间集群可以传播新的技术知识。对欧洲行会的大量研究使我们有可能评估行会在多大程度上创造了这些利益,而不是它们造成的伤害。大约1500年后,行会的力量在欧洲各地分化,在佛兰德斯、荷兰和英格兰逐渐衰落,在法国和意大利幸存下来,在伊比利亚半岛、斯堪的纳维亚半岛和德语地区的大片地区加强。行会的活动导致了整个欧洲在经济表现、城市发展和不平等方面的差异。行会与市场和国家都有重要的互动,这有助于解释为什么欧洲经济在工业化前的关键世纪出现了分歧。
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Guilds and the Economy
Guilds ruled many European crafts and trades from the Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution. Each guild regulated entry to its occupation, requiring any practitioner to become a guild member and then limiting admission to the guild. Guilds intervened in the markets for their members’ products, striving to keep prices high, limit output, suppress competition, and block innovations that might disrupt the status quo. Guilds also acted in input markets, seeking to control access to raw materials, keep wages low, hinder employers from competing for workers, and prevent workers from agitating for better conditions. Guilds treated women particularly severely, usually excluding them from apprenticeship and forbidding any female other than a guild member’s widow from running a workshop. Guilds invested large sums in lobbying governments and political elites to grant, maintain, and extend these privileges. Guilds had the potential to compensate for their cartelistic activities by creating countervailing benefits. Guild quality certification was one possible solution to information asymmetries between producers and consumers, which could have made markets work better. Guild apprenticeship had the potential to solve imperfections in markets for skilled training, and thus to encourage human capital investment. The cartel profits generated by guilds could in theory have encouraged technological innovation by enabling guild masters to appropriate more of the social benefits of their innovations, while guild journeymanship and spatial clustering could diffuse new technical knowledge. A rich scholarship on European guilds makes it possible to assess the degree to which guilds created such benefits, outweighing the harm they caused. After about 1500, guild strength diverged across Europe, declining gradually in Flanders, the Netherlands, and England, surviving in France and Italy, and intensifying across large tracts of Iberia, Scandinavia, and the German-speaking lands. The activities of guilds contributed to variations across Europe in economic performance, urban growth, and inequality. Guilds interacted significantly with both markets and states, which helps explain why European economies diverged in the crucial centuries before industrialization.
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