假装直到你成功:声誉,竞争和Yelp评论欺诈

Michael Luca, G. Zervas
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引用次数: 923

摘要

消费者评论现在是日常决策的一部分。然而,当企业进行评论欺诈,为自己或竞争对手制造虚假评论时,这些评论的可信度就会从根本上受到损害。我们使用两种互补的方法和数据集调查了在流行的评论平台Yelp上进行评论欺诈的经济动机。我们首先分析被Yelp的过滤算法识别为可疑或虚假的餐厅评论。并将这些视为审查欺诈的代理(我们提供证据的假设)。我们提出了四个主要发现。首先,Yelp上大约16%的餐厅评论被过滤了。这些评论往往比其他评论更极端(有利或不利),并且随着时间的推移,可疑评论的流行程度显著增加。其次,当一家餐厅的声誉较弱时,也就是说,当它的评论很少时,或者它最近收到了差评时,它更有可能发生评论欺诈。第三,连锁餐厅?哪个从Yelp获益较少?也不太可能进行审查欺诈。第四,当餐馆面临日益激烈的竞争时,它们更有可能收到不利的虚假评论。使用一个单独的数据集,我们分析了通过Yelp进行的诱捕发现的征求虚假评论的企业。这些数据支持了我们的主要结果,并进一步揭示了企业决定留下虚假评论背后的经济动机。
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Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation, Competition, and Yelp Review Fraud
Consumer reviews are now part of everyday decision-making. Yet, the credibility of these reviews is fundamentally undermined when businesses commit review fraud, creating fake reviews for themselves or their competitors. We investigate the economic incentives to commit review fraud on the popular review platform Yelp, using two complementary approaches and datasets. We begin by analyzing restaurant reviews that are identified by Yelp's filtering algorithm as suspicious, or fake ? and treat these as a proxy for review fraud (an assumption we provide evidence for). We present four main findings. First, roughly 16% of restaurant reviews on Yelp are filtered. These reviews tend to be more extreme (favorable or unfavorable) than other reviews, and the prevalence of suspicious reviews has grown significantly over time. Second, a restaurant is more likely to commit review fraud when its reputation is weak, i.e., when it has few reviews, or it has recently received bad reviews. Third, chain restaurants ? which benefit less from Yelp ? are also less likely to commit review fraud. Fourth, when restaurants face increased competition, they become more likely to receive unfavorable fake reviews. Using a separate dataset, we analyze businesses that were caught soliciting fake reviews through a sting conducted by Yelp. These data support our main results, and shed further light on the economic incentives behind a business's decision to leave fake reviews.
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