技术变革对激励提供的影响

M. Lisciandra
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引用次数: 0

摘要

技术变革对激励条款的影响——激励与风险之间的简单权衡对代理问题至关重要,但并不能充分解释与产出相关的特定薪酬(如19世纪下半叶美国钢铁行业采用的合同制度)的无效。高技术创新率和工人广泛的议价能力使得产出相关薪酬成为次优解。这一风格化的事实揭示了随着新技术的引入,计件工资与固定工资的冲突性质,并激发了对技术变革、议价能力和支付系统之间相互作用的分析,这有助于更好地理解代理问题和激励薪酬的使用。关键词:激励合同,内部承包,工会,技术变革JEL分类:J33, J51, N31, O33
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The Impact of Technological Change on Incentive Provision
The Impact of Technological Change on Incentive Provision - The simple trade-off between incentive and risk, which is crucial to the agency problem, is not a sufficient explanation for the ineffectiveness of a specific output-related pay such as the contract system adopted in the US iron and steel industry during the second half of the nineteenth-century. The high rate of technological innovation along with workers’ extensive bargaining power made output-related pay a sub-optimal solution. This stylised fact unveils the conflicting nature of piece-rate pay compared to fixed pay as new technology is introduced and stimulates an analysis of the interaction between technological change, bargaining powers, and payment systems which can be conducive to a better understanding of the agency problem and the use of incentive pay. Key words: Incentive Contracts, Inside Contracting, Unions, Technological Change. JEL Classification: J33, J51, N31, O33
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