Jihun Bae, Robin Litjens, Chul W. Park, Yachang Zeng
{"title":"媒体报道和管理层盈余指引","authors":"Jihun Bae, Robin Litjens, Chul W. Park, Yachang Zeng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2882405","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The business media disseminates managers’ earnings guidance news more broadly or creates new information content on the guidance (Drake et al. 2014). We hypothesize that the media’s information dissemination encourages managers to continue issuing earnings guidance because their intended messages in earnings guidance can be transmitted more broadly and free of cost to managers. We also hypothesize that the media’s information creation induces managers to stop issuing earnings guidance because the media might interfere with managers’ intended guidance outcomes. Using a comprehensive dataset of media articles covering management guidance from 2007 to 2012, we find evidence supporting these hypotheses. Additionally, we find evidence that the negative impact of the media’s information creation on future guidance issuance is amplified with bad news guidance and attenuated with high analyst following. Our findings provide fresh insight into the information flow in financial markets by documenting not only positive but also negative influences that the media, through its dual roles, exerts on managers’ guidance behavior.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"156 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Media Coverage and Management Earnings Guidance\",\"authors\":\"Jihun Bae, Robin Litjens, Chul W. Park, Yachang Zeng\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2882405\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The business media disseminates managers’ earnings guidance news more broadly or creates new information content on the guidance (Drake et al. 2014). We hypothesize that the media’s information dissemination encourages managers to continue issuing earnings guidance because their intended messages in earnings guidance can be transmitted more broadly and free of cost to managers. We also hypothesize that the media’s information creation induces managers to stop issuing earnings guidance because the media might interfere with managers’ intended guidance outcomes. Using a comprehensive dataset of media articles covering management guidance from 2007 to 2012, we find evidence supporting these hypotheses. Additionally, we find evidence that the negative impact of the media’s information creation on future guidance issuance is amplified with bad news guidance and attenuated with high analyst following. Our findings provide fresh insight into the information flow in financial markets by documenting not only positive but also negative influences that the media, through its dual roles, exerts on managers’ guidance behavior.\",\"PeriodicalId\":440695,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal\",\"volume\":\"156 \",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-12-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2882405\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2882405","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
商业媒体更广泛地传播管理者的盈余指导新闻或在指导上创造新的信息内容(Drake et al. 2014)。我们假设,媒体的信息传播鼓励管理者继续发布盈余指引,因为它们在盈余指引中的预期信息可以更广泛地、免费地传递给管理者。我们还假设媒体的信息创造导致管理者停止发布盈余指导,因为媒体可能会干扰管理者预期的指导结果。利用2007年至2012年管理指导的媒体文章的综合数据集,我们找到了支持这些假设的证据。此外,我们发现有证据表明,媒体信息创造对未来指导发布的负面影响在坏消息指导下被放大,在分析师关注度高的情况下被减弱。我们的研究结果通过记录媒体通过其双重角色对管理者的指导行为施加的积极和消极影响,为金融市场的信息流提供了新的见解。
The business media disseminates managers’ earnings guidance news more broadly or creates new information content on the guidance (Drake et al. 2014). We hypothesize that the media’s information dissemination encourages managers to continue issuing earnings guidance because their intended messages in earnings guidance can be transmitted more broadly and free of cost to managers. We also hypothesize that the media’s information creation induces managers to stop issuing earnings guidance because the media might interfere with managers’ intended guidance outcomes. Using a comprehensive dataset of media articles covering management guidance from 2007 to 2012, we find evidence supporting these hypotheses. Additionally, we find evidence that the negative impact of the media’s information creation on future guidance issuance is amplified with bad news guidance and attenuated with high analyst following. Our findings provide fresh insight into the information flow in financial markets by documenting not only positive but also negative influences that the media, through its dual roles, exerts on managers’ guidance behavior.