DOVE:通过符号控制流断言挖掘来精确定位固件安全漏洞(正在进行中)

Alessandro Danese, G. Pravadelli, V. Bertacco
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引用次数: 3

摘要

在过去十年中,利用未检查的输入固件值进行安全攻击的报告数量一直在上升。为了解决这一令人担忧的趋势,这项工作提出了一种新的检测框架,称为DOVE,能够识别不太可能的固件执行流程,特别是那些可能揭示安全漏洞的流程。DOVE框架通过利用固件执行的符号模拟来运行,并结合概率计算来识别不太可能的执行流程,并向用户提供相应的正式断言。
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DOVE: pinpointing firmware security vulnerabilities via symbolic control flow assertion mining (work-in-progress)
In the past decade, the number of reported security attacks exploiting unchecked input firmware values has been on the rise. To address this concerning trend, this work proposes a novel detection framework, called DOVE, capable of identifying unlikely firmware execution flows, specifically those that may reveal a security vulnerability. The DOVE framework operates by leveraging a symbolic simulation of the firmware's execution, paired with a probability computation that can identify unlikely execution flows and provide to the user corresponding formal assertions.
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