银行分支应用与粉饰:银行策略性使用贷款损失准备金的证据

Di Gong, H. Huizinga, Tianshi Li, Jigao Zhu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在2006年取消对分行的地域限制后,中国的城市商业银行(CCBs)可以申请在省外开设分行。本文表明,建行在提交申请前报告了更高的贷款损失拨备,从而提高了不良贷款的拨备覆盖率,使银行在监管机构看来更安全。我们的发现对于使用倾向得分匹配估计器控制分支应用决策的可能内生性具有鲁棒性,并且当我们考虑放松管制逆转的准自然实验时,它得到了证实。
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Bank Branching Applications and Window Dressing: Evidence on Banks’ Strategic Use of Loan Loss Provisions
After the removal of geographic restrictions on branching in 2006, China’s city commercial banks (CCBs) can apply for permission to branch outside their province. This paper shows that CCBs report higher loan loss provisions before filing an application, thereby increasing the provision coverage ratio of nonperforming loans and making the bank look safer to regulators.Our finding is robust to controlling for possible endogeneity of the branching application decision by employing propensity score matching estimators, and it is confirmed when we consider a quasi-natural experiment of deregulation reversal.
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