我们该如何对待这个坏独裁者?

S. Larcom, M. Sarr, T. Willems
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引用次数: 5

摘要

最近,国际社会通过设立国际刑事法院,加强了对恶意独裁者进行起诉的承诺,从而增加了时间不一致(事后大赦)的损失。这阻止了独裁者犯下暴行。然而,与此同时,这种承诺选择了一种更糟糕的独裁者。此外,当独裁者的行为如此恶劣,以至于维持他在位的成本被认为比时间不一致的成本更大时,国际社会仍然会给予大赦。因此,增加对事后惩罚的承诺实际上可能会诱使独裁者恶化他们的行为,纯粹是为了“打开”大赦选项,迫使国际社会在时间上不一致。
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What Shall We Do with the Bad Dictator?
Recently, the international community has increased its commitment to prosecute malicious dictators by establishing the International Criminal Court, thereby raising its loss of being time-inconsistent (granting amnesties ex post). This deters dictators from committing atrocities. Simultaneously, however, such commitment selects dictators of a worse type. Moreover, when the dictator behaves so badly that the costs of keeping him in place are considered to be greater than those of being time-inconsistent, the international community will still grant amnesty. Consequently, increased commitment to ex post punishment may actually induce dictators to worsen their behaviour, purely to "unlock" the amnesty option and force the international community into time-inconsistency.
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