所有权和治理风格:来自非金融大股东的新证据

Ryan D. Israelsen, Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, J. Weston
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引用次数: 1

摘要

不同类型的区块持有者管理方式不同。承诺(非金融)的大股东自认为活跃的可能性是其6倍,他们的文件语言反映了通过声音而不是退出来进行治理。这些治理上的差异贯穿于公司的整个生命周期。我们还发现,承诺区块的治理可能会影响先前研究对被动投资者围绕指数阈值进行治理的经济解释。最后,拥有承诺区块的公司的绩效与拥有财务区块的公司相似,这与最优所有权的动态均衡模型一致。拥有坚定股东的公司代理成本似乎更低。
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Ownership and Governance Style: New Evidence from Nonfinancial Blockholders
Different types of blockholders govern differently. Committed (non-financial) blockholders are 6 times more likely to self-identify as active, and the language of their filings reflects governance through voice rather than exit. These differences in governance persist over a firm’s life cycle. We also find that governance by committed blocks may contaminate previous studies’ economic interpretation about governance by passive investors around index thresholds. Finally, the performance of firms with a committed block is similar to firms with a financial block, consistent with dynamic equilibrium models of optimal ownership. Firms with committed blockholders appear to have lower agency costs.
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