{"title":"所有权和治理风格:来自非金融大股东的新证据","authors":"Ryan D. Israelsen, Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, J. Weston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3491708","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Different types of blockholders govern differently. Committed (non-financial) blockholders are 6 times more likely to self-identify as active, and the language of their filings reflects governance through voice rather than exit. These differences in governance persist over a firm’s life cycle. We also find that governance by committed blocks may contaminate previous studies’ economic interpretation about governance by passive investors around index thresholds. Finally, the performance of firms with a committed block is similar to firms with a financial block, consistent with dynamic equilibrium models of optimal ownership. Firms with committed blockholders appear to have lower agency costs.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Ownership and Governance Style: New Evidence from Nonfinancial Blockholders\",\"authors\":\"Ryan D. Israelsen, Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, J. Weston\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3491708\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Different types of blockholders govern differently. Committed (non-financial) blockholders are 6 times more likely to self-identify as active, and the language of their filings reflects governance through voice rather than exit. These differences in governance persist over a firm’s life cycle. We also find that governance by committed blocks may contaminate previous studies’ economic interpretation about governance by passive investors around index thresholds. Finally, the performance of firms with a committed block is similar to firms with a financial block, consistent with dynamic equilibrium models of optimal ownership. Firms with committed blockholders appear to have lower agency costs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":416291,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IO: Firm Structure\",\"volume\":\"50 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-11-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IO: Firm Structure\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3491708\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IO: Firm Structure","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3491708","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Ownership and Governance Style: New Evidence from Nonfinancial Blockholders
Different types of blockholders govern differently. Committed (non-financial) blockholders are 6 times more likely to self-identify as active, and the language of their filings reflects governance through voice rather than exit. These differences in governance persist over a firm’s life cycle. We also find that governance by committed blocks may contaminate previous studies’ economic interpretation about governance by passive investors around index thresholds. Finally, the performance of firms with a committed block is similar to firms with a financial block, consistent with dynamic equilibrium models of optimal ownership. Firms with committed blockholders appear to have lower agency costs.