{"title":"强制确认表外负债是否影响资本结构选择?来自SFAS 158的证据","authors":"Michael Axenrod, M. Kisser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3331061","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether mandatory recognition of previously disclosed off-balance sheet items affects corporate capital structure decisions. Specifically, we use the introduction of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158 as a quasi-exogenous shock to financial reporting decisions as it requires sponsors of defined benefit (DB) pension plans to recognize the level of pension and healthcare plan funding explicitly on the balance sheet. Our findings show that DB plan sponsors did not actively decrease financial leverage following the new accounting standard. This also obtains for subsamples of plan sponsors with tight or violated financial covenants or plan sponsors with unrated debt or low analyst following. The results suggest that the mandatory recognition did not involve sufficient costs to warrant a change in corporate funding decisions.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does Mandatory Recognition of Off-Balance Sheet Liabilities Affect Capital Structure Choice? Evidence from SFAS 158\",\"authors\":\"Michael Axenrod, M. Kisser\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3331061\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We investigate whether mandatory recognition of previously disclosed off-balance sheet items affects corporate capital structure decisions. Specifically, we use the introduction of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158 as a quasi-exogenous shock to financial reporting decisions as it requires sponsors of defined benefit (DB) pension plans to recognize the level of pension and healthcare plan funding explicitly on the balance sheet. Our findings show that DB plan sponsors did not actively decrease financial leverage following the new accounting standard. This also obtains for subsamples of plan sponsors with tight or violated financial covenants or plan sponsors with unrated debt or low analyst following. The results suggest that the mandatory recognition did not involve sufficient costs to warrant a change in corporate funding decisions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":204440,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-06-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3331061\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3331061","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Does Mandatory Recognition of Off-Balance Sheet Liabilities Affect Capital Structure Choice? Evidence from SFAS 158
We investigate whether mandatory recognition of previously disclosed off-balance sheet items affects corporate capital structure decisions. Specifically, we use the introduction of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158 as a quasi-exogenous shock to financial reporting decisions as it requires sponsors of defined benefit (DB) pension plans to recognize the level of pension and healthcare plan funding explicitly on the balance sheet. Our findings show that DB plan sponsors did not actively decrease financial leverage following the new accounting standard. This also obtains for subsamples of plan sponsors with tight or violated financial covenants or plan sponsors with unrated debt or low analyst following. The results suggest that the mandatory recognition did not involve sufficient costs to warrant a change in corporate funding decisions.