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引用次数: 1

摘要

能源灵活性管理可以极大地支持能源结构更平稳、更具成本效益的绿色转型。然而,只有用户成功地参与到这一过程中,才能有效地管理住宅负荷的灵活性。在本文中,我们提出了一个优化框架,该框架结合了对生产消费者提供不同形式的货币和非货币激励,即奖励,彩票,同行压力,以在特定时间段提供灵活性。经济奖励是根据一个简单但非常强大的线性激励功能提供的。该框架还包含了购电和售电的每个时间段的动态电价。将DR聚合器的优化问题建模为成本最小化问题;它的解决方案是一个Stackelberg游戏,概述了DR聚合器对用户效用函数的完整信息的情况。此外,针对聚合器不知道用户效用函数的情况下的灵活性管理问题,提出了一种分布式迭代算法。数值结果表明,该优化框架能够以最小的激励成本从用户那里获得所需的灵活性,特别是当货币奖励与同伴压力相结合时。
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An Optimization Framework for Effective Flexibility Management for Prosumers
Energy flexibility management can significantly support the smoother and more cost-effective green transformation of the energy mix. However, effective management of the flexibility of residential loads can only be achieved if users are successfully engaged into the process. In this paper, we propose an optimization framework that incorporates provision of different forms of monetary and non-monetary incentives to prosumers, i.e., rewards, lotteries, peer-pressure, for providing flexibility at specific time slots. Economic rewards are offered according to a simple, yet very powerful, linear incentives' function. Dynamic tariffs per time slot for purchasing and selling electricity are accommodated in this framework as well. The optimization problem of the DR aggregator is modeled as a cost-minimization one; its solution as a Stackelberg game is outlined for the case of full information on user-utility functions by the DR aggregator. Moreover, a distributed iterative algorithm is developed for solving the flexibility-management problem in the case where user-utility functions are not known to the aggregator. Numerical results show that this optimization framework is able to elicit the required flexibility from users at a minimum incentive cost, especially when monetary rewards are combined with peer pressure.
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