不完整的无知

J. Haas, K. Vogt
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引用次数: 0

摘要

人既不能探究自己知道的事,也不能探究自己不知道的事。这个问题的第一阶段最近被称为教条主义难题。这种思想认为,如果知识与探究不相容,知识就会滋生教条主义。把这个问题的第二阶段称为无知之谜。探究始于不知道自己想要知道什么,但它不能简单地从无知开始。我们认为,一个令人信服的解决方案可以共同解决教条主义和无知难题。我们认为,询问者是完全无知的。他们有预见的概念,这使他们能够提出问题。我们为问题补充的极简主义解释辩护。本章认为,问题要求调查者提高对问题的认知状态。这种改善可能会在心理上阻止进一步的调查。但是询问者的认知状态并不是因此在认识论上封闭的。原则上,它允许进一步调查。
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Incomplete Ignorance
One can neither inquire into what one knows nor into what one doesn’t know. The first leg of this problem has recently been called the Dogmatism Puzzle. If knowledge is incompatible with inquiry, the thought goes, knowledge breeds dogmatism. Call the second leg of the problem the Ignorance Puzzle. Inquiry starts from not knowing what one seeks to know, and yet it cannot simply start from ignorance. A compelling solution, we argue, jointly addresses the Dogmatism and Ignorance Puzzles. Inquirers, we propose, are in Incomplete Ignorance. They have proleptic concepts, which enable them to ask questions. We defend a minimalist account of the complement of questions. Questions, this chapter argues, call for an improvement of the inquirer’s cognitive state regarding the issue. Such improvement may psychologically close off further inquiry. But the inquirer’s cognitive state is not thereby epistemically closed. In principle, it permits further inquiry.
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