Pub Date : 2020-01-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0003
Kathrin Glüer
One debate the Pyrrhonian skeptics had with the Epicureans concerned the relation between sense perceptions and beliefs. The debate centers on the Epicurean claim that all perceptions are true, a claim rejected by the Skeptics, who proceed on the assumption that there is no judgment component in perception, and it echoes widely through today’s philosophy of perception. In the past the author has defended a non-standard version of intentionalism, according to which (visual) experiences indeed are beliefs, but have contents—so-called looks-contents—that, if ever, very rarely are false. This chapter works out how this view can nevertheless account for non-veridical experience. It harnesses the rational role of experience to work out a precise way of characterizing non-veridical experience in terms of misleadingness.
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Pub Date : 2020-01-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0004
Megan Feeney, Susanna Schellenberg
This article defends liberalism, that is, the view that perceivers are justified in their perceptual beliefs simply on grounds of the perceptions on which the beliefs are based. By critically discussing several conservativist objections, it shows that liberalism is compatible with standard Bayesianism. This argument calls into question an assumption in the conservatist objections, an assumption that can be traced back to Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely, that the acquisition of perceptual evidence is primarily a matter of forming introspective beliefs about seemings or appearances. By contrast, this essay argues that the formation of introspective beliefs is an extra step over and above the acquisition of perceptual evidence. Forming the relevant introspective beliefs requires the possession of seeming or appearance concepts. However, subjects can acquire perceptual evidence, on this view, even if they lack these concepts or are incapable of forming the relevant introspective beliefs. Thus, the essay defends Bayesian liberalism.
{"title":"Bayesian Liberalism","authors":"Megan Feeney, Susanna Schellenberg","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This article defends liberalism, that is, the view that perceivers are justified in their perceptual beliefs simply on grounds of the perceptions on which the beliefs are based. By critically discussing several conservativist objections, it shows that liberalism is compatible with standard Bayesianism. This argument calls into question an assumption in the conservatist objections, an assumption that can be traced back to Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely, that the acquisition of perceptual evidence is primarily a matter of forming introspective beliefs about seemings or appearances. By contrast, this essay argues that the formation of introspective beliefs is an extra step over and above the acquisition of perceptual evidence. Forming the relevant introspective beliefs requires the possession of seeming or appearance concepts. However, subjects can acquire perceptual evidence, on this view, even if they lack these concepts or are incapable of forming the relevant introspective beliefs. Thus, the essay defends Bayesian liberalism.","PeriodicalId":393683,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus","volume":"14 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128999492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0002
J. Morrison
There is variation in how people perceive colors and other secondary qualities. The challenge of perceptual variation is to say whose perceptions are accurate. According to Sextus, Protagoras’ response is that all of our perceptions might be accurate. As this response is traditionally developed, it is difficult to explain color illusion and color constancy. This difficulty is due to a widespread assumption called perceptual atomism. This chapter argues that, if we want to develop Protagoras’ response, we need to give up perceptual atomism. It ends with a brief sketch of an alternative called perceptual structuralism.
{"title":"Perceptual Variation and Relativism","authors":"J. Morrison","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"There is variation in how people perceive colors and other secondary qualities. The challenge of perceptual variation is to say whose perceptions are accurate. According to Sextus, Protagoras’ response is that all of our perceptions might be accurate. As this response is traditionally developed, it is difficult to explain color illusion and color constancy. This difficulty is due to a widespread assumption called perceptual atomism. This chapter argues that, if we want to develop Protagoras’ response, we need to give up perceptual atomism. It ends with a brief sketch of an alternative called perceptual structuralism.","PeriodicalId":393683,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114189040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0013
J. Haas, K. Vogt
One can neither inquire into what one knows nor into what one doesn’t know. The first leg of this problem has recently been called the Dogmatism Puzzle. If knowledge is incompatible with inquiry, the thought goes, knowledge breeds dogmatism. Call the second leg of the problem the Ignorance Puzzle. Inquiry starts from not knowing what one seeks to know, and yet it cannot simply start from ignorance. A compelling solution, we argue, jointly addresses the Dogmatism and Ignorance Puzzles. Inquirers, we propose, are in Incomplete Ignorance. They have proleptic concepts, which enable them to ask questions. We defend a minimalist account of the complement of questions. Questions, this chapter argues, call for an improvement of the inquirer’s cognitive state regarding the issue. Such improvement may psychologically close off further inquiry. But the inquirer’s cognitive state is not thereby epistemically closed. In principle, it permits further inquiry.
{"title":"Incomplete Ignorance","authors":"J. Haas, K. Vogt","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190946302.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"One can neither inquire into what one knows nor into what one doesn’t know. The first leg of this problem has recently been called the Dogmatism Puzzle. If knowledge is incompatible with inquiry, the thought goes, knowledge breeds dogmatism. Call the second leg of the problem the Ignorance Puzzle. Inquiry starts from not knowing what one seeks to know, and yet it cannot simply start from ignorance. A compelling solution, we argue, jointly addresses the Dogmatism and Ignorance Puzzles. Inquirers, we propose, are in Incomplete Ignorance. They have proleptic concepts, which enable them to ask questions. We defend a minimalist account of the complement of questions. Questions, this chapter argues, call for an improvement of the inquirer’s cognitive state regarding the issue. Such improvement may psychologically close off further inquiry. But the inquirer’s cognitive state is not thereby epistemically closed. In principle, it permits further inquiry.","PeriodicalId":393683,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121192918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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