{"title":"竞赛中的部分信息披露","authors":"Derek J. Clark, Tapas Kundu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3808118","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, but base their analysis upon active participation in the contest by all types of the informed player. We extend their analysis to equilibria in which some informed types exert no effort in the contest, showing how this changes the type of information disclosure that arises.","PeriodicalId":119201,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Partial Information Disclosure in a Contest\",\"authors\":\"Derek J. Clark, Tapas Kundu\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3808118\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, but base their analysis upon active participation in the contest by all types of the informed player. We extend their analysis to equilibria in which some informed types exert no effort in the contest, showing how this changes the type of information disclosure that arises.\",\"PeriodicalId\":119201,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal\",\"volume\":\"51 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-04-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3808118\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3808118","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
Zhang and Zhou(2016)利用Kamenica and Gentzkow(2011)的贝叶斯说服概念分析了信息片面不对称竞争中的信息披露。他们表明，努力最大化的设计师可以操纵信息披露来增加比赛中的预期努力，但他们的分析是基于所有类型的知情玩家对比赛的积极参与。我们将他们的分析扩展到均衡，在这种均衡中，一些知情人士在竞争中不付出任何努力，显示这是如何改变出现的信息披露类型的。
Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, but base their analysis upon active participation in the contest by all types of the informed player. We extend their analysis to equilibria in which some informed types exert no effort in the contest, showing how this changes the type of information disclosure that arises.
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