Laurent Bouton, Jorge Gallego, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton
{"title":"实验室的决选","authors":"Laurent Bouton, Jorge Gallego, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton","doi":"10.3386/W25949","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n We study experimentally the properties of the majority runoff system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher coordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority runoff rule. We find strong coordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite these differences in voting behavior, we find small and mostly not significant differences in electoral outcomes and hence voters’ welfare.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Runoff Elections in the Laboratory\",\"authors\":\"Laurent Bouton, Jorge Gallego, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton\",\"doi\":\"10.3386/W25949\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n We study experimentally the properties of the majority runoff system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher coordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority runoff rule. We find strong coordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite these differences in voting behavior, we find small and mostly not significant differences in electoral outcomes and hence voters’ welfare.\",\"PeriodicalId\":170831,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25949\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25949","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study experimentally the properties of the majority runoff system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher coordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority runoff rule. We find strong coordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite these differences in voting behavior, we find small and mostly not significant differences in electoral outcomes and hence voters’ welfare.