实验室的决选

Laurent Bouton, Jorge Gallego, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton
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引用次数: 6

摘要

实验研究了多数决制度的性质,并将其与多数决制度进行了比较。我们的重点是杜维格的著名预测,即相对于多数决选规则,多数决选规则会导致对有限数量候选人的选票进行更高程度的协调。我们发现两种体制下都有很强的协调力量。然而,正如理论所预测的那样,在某些情况下,这些力量在多元化下更强。尽管投票行为存在这些差异,但我们发现选举结果和选民福利之间的差异很小,而且大多不显著。
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Runoff Elections in the Laboratory
We study experimentally the properties of the majority runoff system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher coordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority runoff rule. We find strong coordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite these differences in voting behavior, we find small and mostly not significant differences in electoral outcomes and hence voters’ welfare.
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