董事会多样性和股权成本(CoE)

A. Hossain, L. Kryzanowski
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们研究了董事会多样性对公司股权成本(CoE)的影响。利用多样性的综合指数,我们发现多样性越大,CoE越低。在进一步的分析中,我们报告说,当公司经历较低的内部(或外部)监督或面临较高的代理问题或遭受较大的财务约束时,这种关联更为突出。我们的结果是稳健的,例如倾向得分匹配;工具变量法;使用替代的CoE措施;使用额外的(可能有影响的省略)变量,以及各种其他敏感性和内生性测试。
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Board Diversity and Cost of Equity (CoE)
We examine the effects of board diversity on corporate cost of equity (CoE). Using a composite index for diversity, we find that greater diversity leads to lower CoE. In further analysis, we report that this association is more prominent when the firm is experiencing lower internal (or external) monitoring or facing higher agency issues or suffering from greater financial constraints. Our results are robust to, e.g. propensity score matching; instrumental variable approach; use of alternate measures of CoE; use of additional (possibly influential omitted) variables, and various other sensitivity and endogeneity tests.
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