解决多德-弗兰克法案的漏洞:董事的风险管理监督义务

Kristin N. Johnson
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引用次数: 10

摘要

在导致最近的金融危机的几年里,金融理论家引入了创新的方法,包括定量金融模型和衍生工具,以衡量和减轻风险暴露。在金融危机期间,面临破产的金融机构暴露了对这些复杂风险管理方法普遍存在的误解、误用和错误假设。随着金融市场亏损升级并引发流动性和偿付能力危机,评论人士对大型金融机构的董事和高管的风险管理决策提出了严厉批评。通过采用《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案》,国会直接或间接地解决了大型复杂金融机构的某些风险管理监管问题。为了改善这些机构的风险管理监督,国会实施了几项结构性改革,改变了金融机构董事会的组成和职责。不幸的是,即使在《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)改革通过之后,金融机构仍然容易受到企业风险管理监督中同样严重错误的影响,这些错误在最近的金融危机中引发了系统性风险担忧。虽然《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)可能会增强董事会的风险管理监督能力,但对董事会委员会依赖的重大担忧依然存在。组织文献表明,影响群体决策的认知偏见和结构限制将继续困扰董事会有效管理风险的努力。本文认为,要解决企业风险管理监管的薄弱环节,降低系统性风险的威胁,有必要进行针对性更强的改革。
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Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors' Risk Management Oversight Obligations
In the years leading to the recent financial crisis, finance theorists introduced innovative methods, including quantitative financial models and derivative instruments, to measure and mitigate risk exposure. During the financial crisis, financial institutions facing insolvency revealed pervasive misunderstandings, misapplications, and mistaken assumptions regarding these complex risk management methods. As losses in financial markets escalated and caused liquidity and solvency crises, commentators sharply criticized directors and executives at large financial institutions for their risk management decisions. By adopting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress directly and indirectly addresses certain risk management oversight concerns at large, complex financial institutions. To improve risk management oversight at these institutions, Congress imposed several structural reforms altering the composition and obligations of financial institutions' boards of directors. Unfortunately, even after the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act reforms, financial institutions remain vulnerable to the same critical errors in enterprise risk management oversight that engendered systemic risk concerns during the recent financial crisis. While the Dodd-Frank Act may enhance a board's risk management oversight capabilities, significant concerns persist regarding reliance on board committees. Organizational literature suggests that cognitive biases and structural limitations that influence group decision making will continue to plague boards' efforts to effectively manage risk. This Article argues that better-tailored reforms are necessary to address weaknesses in enterprise risk management regulation and to reduce the threat of systemic risk.
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