{"title":"连锁店悖论的“真正连续”解决方案","authors":"Bryce M. Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2807682","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper resolves the chainstore paradox by viewing each game of a monopolist against a single competitor as a sequential game. Every game is done under perfect and complete information. In this sequential game, with subgame perfection imposed, the number of sequential stages - even or odd - matter greatly for the resulting equilibrium, with odd supporting the deterrence theory equilibrium and even supporting the induction theory equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"47 23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A 'Truly Sequential' Resolution to Chainstore Paradox\",\"authors\":\"Bryce M. Kim\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2807682\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper resolves the chainstore paradox by viewing each game of a monopolist against a single competitor as a sequential game. Every game is done under perfect and complete information. In this sequential game, with subgame perfection imposed, the number of sequential stages - even or odd - matter greatly for the resulting equilibrium, with odd supporting the deterrence theory equilibrium and even supporting the induction theory equilibrium.\",\"PeriodicalId\":142139,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Monopoly\",\"volume\":\"47 23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-07-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Monopoly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2807682\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Monopoly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2807682","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A 'Truly Sequential' Resolution to Chainstore Paradox
This paper resolves the chainstore paradox by viewing each game of a monopolist against a single competitor as a sequential game. Every game is done under perfect and complete information. In this sequential game, with subgame perfection imposed, the number of sequential stages - even or odd - matter greatly for the resulting equilibrium, with odd supporting the deterrence theory equilibrium and even supporting the induction theory equilibrium.
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