Education: Ideas or Knowledge?

ed knowledge of spatial relations and of characteristics applicable to the kind of places and objects dealt with. Conversely, apprehension of abstract systems of classification and of relations depends upon knowledge of particulars, upon the arrangement of particulars on the basis of similarities and uniformities, and upon the generalization of the prin-systems of classification and of relations depends upon knowledge of particulars, upon the arrangement of particulars on the basis of similarities and uniformities, and upon the generalization of the principles of order discovered. When speaking of "facts," President Hutchins doubtless refers primarily to items falling within the first mode of knowledge, namely, the designation and description of specific objects and events. There is no doubt but that in recent generations there has been an overemphasis or wrong emphasis on this type of knowledge. If one considers how many things and events there are in the world and how lengthily each might be described, one is appalled at the amount of information that might be accumulated if men were not restrained. There are a billion or more human beings now in existence whose heights, weights, head shapes, habits, travels, opinions, incomes, diets, tools, diseases, and scars might be recorded; and men long dead are not entirely beyond the reach of investigation. A census of farm animals has been made; but we can only guess at how many other animals are waiting to have facts about them made public. Without mentioning stars, mountains, trees, brooks, houses, or telephone poles, one can readily see that any person with imagination would be horrified by the huge mass of available facts pressing for admission into university curriculums, and by realization that large batches of such facts are from time to time actually slipping into university courses. Of course professors do not demand that university courses present descriptions of all particulars that might be described; and most of them resent the accusation that the particulars which they describe are unimportant. It is true, nevertheless, that there are various factors tending to encourage more or less random dipping into the huge reservoir of possible description. One basic factor is that the problem of formulating principles for determining what is important has not been dealt with adequately. Another is that many scholars, eager to discover laws and general principles but having no clear notions as to the methods and principles relevant to such research, proceed hopefully and vigorously on the asThis content downloaded from 157.55.39.215 on Wed, 31 Aug 2016 04:18:18 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms