信息论对罗斯柴尔德-斯蒂格利茨保险市场模型的再思考

Robert Mamada
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摘要

本文从信息论的角度重新考虑了罗斯柴尔德-斯蒂格利茨保险市场模型。罗斯柴尔德和斯蒂格利茨(1978)的开创性工作已成为保险市场的标准模型之一。然而,经济学家发现用这个模型很难理解一些问题。首先,该模型表明所有的均衡都是分离均衡,这种分离均衡在某些条件下可能不存在。其次,该模型基于保险消费者效用函数的无差异曲线,这在经验上很难得到。本文试图通过使用Spence所谓的保险消费者的可观察和不可改变属性的“指数”来克服这些困难。本文将这一问题视为一个序列贝叶斯博弈(一种信息不完全的动态博弈),并利用信息论来估计指标中所含信息的成本和收益。因此,本文表明,如果信息的成本和收益落在一定范围内,使用指标就足以避免不存在均衡。此外,获得指数比指定每个保险消费者的效用函数更容易。
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A reconsideration of the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance market model by information theory
This paper reconsiders the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance market model by information theory. The seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1978) has become one of the standard models of insurance markets. However, there are a couple of issues that economists find it difficult to understand with this model. First, this model shows that all the equilibria are separating equilibria, and such separating equilibria may not exist under certain conditions. Second, this model is based on the indifference curves of the insurance consumers' utility functions which could be difficult to obtain empirically. This paper attempts to overcome these difficulties by using what Spence called "indices" of observable and unalterable attributes of insurance consumers. This paper approaches the problem as a sequential Bayesian game (a dynamic game with incomplete information), and uses information theory to estimate the costs and benefits of the information contained in indices. Consequently, this paper shows that if the costs and benefits of information fall within certain ranges, using indices is sufficient to avoid the non-existence of equilibria. Furthermore, obtaining indices is easier than specifying the utility function for each insurance consumer.
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