降低平价医疗法案:缺乏吸引力的健康保险和低入学率

Brian Blase
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引用次数: 1

摘要

当《患者保护和平价医疗法案》(ACA)于2010年签署成为法律时,许多团体预测有多少人会参加符合该法案新规定和要求的医疗保险计划(ACA计划)。近六年后,参加医疗保险交换计划的人数远远低于最初的预测,特别是对于那些收入过高而没有资格获得补贴以降低ACA计划高额免赔额的人。缺乏至少中等收入的交易所参保人表明,个人强制保险并没有像最初预期的那样激励许多人,特别是更年轻、更健康和更富有的人购买保险。保险公司在ACA计划上的巨额损失表明,整体风险池比最初预计的要严重得多,成本也高得多,这表明,为了避免造成逆向选择的恶性循环,该法案可能需要进行重大修订。
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Downgrading the Affordable Care Act: Unattractive Health Insurance and Lower Enrollment
When the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law in 2010, many groups projected how many people would enroll in health insurance plans satisfying the law’s new rules and requirements (ACA plans). Nearly six years later, enrollment in health insurance exchange plans is far short of initial projections, particularly for people who earn too much to qualify for subsidies to reduce high ACA plan deductibles. The dearth of exchange enrollees with at least a middle-class income indicates that the individual mandate is not motivating as many people, particularly younger, healthier, and wealthier people, to purchase coverage as was originally expected. Large insurer losses on ACA plans show that the overall risk pool is sicker and much more costly than originally projected, and are an indication that the law may require significant revision in order to avoid causing an adverse-selection spiral.
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