问责制取消一步

Axel Sonntag, D. J. Zizzo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在实际努力实验室和在线团队生产实验中,我们分析了不同个人责任条件下的个人努力。在一个重复的环境中,工作人员会收到一个关于他们的同事之前的努力的扭曲信号。我们改变了生产可以直接追溯到参与者个人努力水平或性质的程度。我们发现,与没有个人问责制相比,在完全问责制下,个人的贡献要少得多,而且随着时间的推移,贡献的下降幅度要大得多。然而,在附加条件下,我们允许内生性问责制并观察最高产出水平。我们的结论是,除去一步的问责制利用了潜在监督的威慑效应,但没有强迫受试者了解他们表现不佳的同伴,从而限制了贡献随时间的典型下降。
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Accountability One Step Removed
In a real effort lab and online team production experiment we analyze individual effort under different conditions of individual accountability. In a repeated setting workers receive a distorted signal about their co-players’ previous efforts. We vary the degree to which production can be directly traced back to a participant’s individual effort level or nature. We find that individuals produce much less and the decline of contributions over time is significantly steeper under full as compared to no personal accountability. However, in an additional condition, we allow for endogenous accountability and observe the highest output level. We conclude that accountability one step removed makes use of a deterrence effect of potential monitoring but without forcing subjects to learn about their under-performing peers, thus limiting the typical decline of contributions over time.
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