{"title":"导论:死亡与意义","authors":"M. Hauskeller","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000205","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Due to the Covid pandemic, the Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Conference 2020 had to be postponed and was eventually held online in July 2021. The conference, on which this volume is based, was meant to explore the connection between death and meaning (in life). What motivated me to host a conference on that particular theme was initially my interest in the philosophical debate on human enhancement and the possibility and desirability (or undesirability) of radical life extension. Naturally, that debate is complex and touches on many different aspects of the human condition. However, there is one claim in particular that captured my attention because the question it raised struck me as being of fundamental importance for the entire discussion. It is the claim, occasionally made by transhumanists and other proponents of radical life extension, that death undercuts meaning, in the sense that as long as our lives will have to end someday, our lives cannot possibly be meaningful (More, 1990). Even religion with its promise of a life after death, it is alleged, can only ever achieve the illusion of meaning, but never the real thing. This is mainly because true meaningfulness cannot be derived from being part of somebody else’s (in this case God’s) plan, which supposedly has the inevitable effect of stifling a sense of our own personal value. Yet it is claimed that without such a sense of personal value our (individual) lives must lack true meaning, for what gives our lives (true) meaning is ‘the continuation of the process of improvement and transformation of ourselves into ever higher forms’ (More, 1990, p. 10). 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引用次数: 0
摘要
由于新冠肺炎疫情,英国皇家哲学研究所2020年年会不得不推迟,最终于2021年7月在网上举行。这本书的基础是这次会议,旨在探讨死亡与(生命中的)意义之间的联系。促使我举办这个特别主题会议的原因,最初是我对人类增强以及激进延长寿命的可能性和可取性(或不可取性)的哲学辩论感兴趣。当然,这场辩论是复杂的,涉及人类状况的许多不同方面。然而,有一种说法特别引起了我的注意,因为它提出的问题对整个讨论具有根本性的重要性。超人类主义者和其他激进延长生命的支持者偶尔会说,死亡削弱了生命的意义,因为只要我们的生命总有一天会结束,我们的生命就不可能有意义(More, 1990)。据称,即使是承诺死后生命的宗教,也只能实现意义的幻觉,而永远无法实现真正的意义。这主要是因为真正的意义不能从成为别人(在这种情况下是上帝)计划的一部分中获得,这被认为会不可避免地扼杀我们自己的个人价值感。然而,有人声称,如果没有这种个人价值感,我们(个体)的生活必然缺乏真正的意义,因为赋予我们生活(真正)意义的是“不断改进和将我们自己转化为更高形式的过程”(More, 1990, p. 10)。由于这一过程被理解为开放式的,很明显,死亡结束了这一过程,不仅摧毁了任何个体生命在其结束时所能拥有的意义,而且摧毁了意义的可能性。如果我们的生命只有在追求“无止境的自我扩展和进步”时才有意义(More, 1990, p. 12),那么生命只有在永不结束时才有意义。这种与意义的联系很可能在一定程度上解释了为什么死亡经常被认为是最大的邪恶。它是最大的罪恶不仅仅因为它终结
Due to the Covid pandemic, the Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Conference 2020 had to be postponed and was eventually held online in July 2021. The conference, on which this volume is based, was meant to explore the connection between death and meaning (in life). What motivated me to host a conference on that particular theme was initially my interest in the philosophical debate on human enhancement and the possibility and desirability (or undesirability) of radical life extension. Naturally, that debate is complex and touches on many different aspects of the human condition. However, there is one claim in particular that captured my attention because the question it raised struck me as being of fundamental importance for the entire discussion. It is the claim, occasionally made by transhumanists and other proponents of radical life extension, that death undercuts meaning, in the sense that as long as our lives will have to end someday, our lives cannot possibly be meaningful (More, 1990). Even religion with its promise of a life after death, it is alleged, can only ever achieve the illusion of meaning, but never the real thing. This is mainly because true meaningfulness cannot be derived from being part of somebody else’s (in this case God’s) plan, which supposedly has the inevitable effect of stifling a sense of our own personal value. Yet it is claimed that without such a sense of personal value our (individual) lives must lack true meaning, for what gives our lives (true) meaning is ‘the continuation of the process of improvement and transformation of ourselves into ever higher forms’ (More, 1990, p. 10). Since this process is understood as open-ended, it is clear that death, by bringing it to an end, destroys not only the meaning that any individual life can have up to the point of its termination, but the very possibility of meaning. If our lives can only have meaning if we can pursue ‘our own expansion and progress without end’ (More, 1990, p. 12), then life can only be meaningful if it never ends. That connection to meaning may well play a part in why death is often perceived and described as the greatest evil. It is the greatest of evils not merely because it sets an end to