兄弟,你能给我一块钱吗?设计有效的外汇流动性援助框架

Dan Awrey
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引用次数: 7

摘要

金融危机管理的核心原则要求央行以优质抵押品为抵押,以惩罚性利率向有偿付能力但流动性差的银行和其他金融机构自由放贷。尽管这些原则常常被视为理所当然,但它们是为这样一个世界而设计的:在这个世界里,央行有能力创造以本币计价的货币,银行和其他金融机构也可以发行以本币计价的存款和其他短期负债。不幸的是,这不是我们生活的世界。在金融机构依赖短期外币负债作为融资来源的地方,这些原则的应用远非直截了当。这是欧洲美元市场的世界。全球金融危机生动地说明了庞大的欧洲美元市场存在所带来的潜在系统性风险。面对系统性的外汇流动性危机,各国央行难以获得向本国银行体系提供紧急流动性援助所需的外汇储备。作为回应,美联储和其他主要中央银行建立了一个互换额度网络,目的是向国际金融体系提供外币流动性援助。央行的货币互换额度被誉为应对金融危机最重要、最有效的政策之一。然而,尽管人们可能很容易将互换额度视为防范未来外汇流动性危机的有效手段,但目前的互换额度结构未能建立真正可信的国际承诺,也未能约束这种雄心勃勃的国家支持的流动性保险形式所产生的道德风险问题。本文探讨了外币流动性问题带来的独特政策挑战,以及如何建立一个更有效的框架来提供外币流动性援助。
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Brother, Can You Spare a Dollar? Designing an Effective Framework for Foreign Currency Liquidity Assistance
The core principles of financial crisis management call upon central banks to lend freely, against good quality collateral, and at a penalty rate of interest, to solvent but illiquid banks and other financial institutions. While often taken for granted, these principles were designed for a world in which central banks have the capacity to create money denominated in the domestic currency, and where banks and other financial institutions issue deposits and other short-term liabilities denominated in the same currency. Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. The application of these principles is far from straightforward where financial institutions rely on short-term foreign currency liabilities as a source of financing. This is the world of the Eurodollar market. The global financial crisis vividly illustrated the potential systemic risks arising from the existence of a large Eurodollar market. Faced with a systemic foreign currency liquidity crisis, central banks struggled to secure access to the foreign currency reserves needed to provide emergency liquidity assistance to their domestic banking systems. In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve and other major central banks established a network of swap lines with the objective of providing foreign currency liquidity assistance to the international financial system. The central bank swap lines have been hailed as one of the most important and effective policy responses to the financial crisis. However, while it may be tempting to view them as an effective prophylactic against future foreign currency liquidity crises, the current structure of the swap lines fails to establish truly credible international commitments or constrain the moral hazard problems stemming from this ambitious form of state-sponsored liquidity insurance. This paper examines the unique policy challenges posed by foreign currency liquidity problems, along with how to build a more effective framework for the provision of foreign currency liquidity assistance.
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