Alberto Martín, Caterina Mendicino, Alejandro Van der Ghote
The Global Financial Crisis fostered the design and adoption of macroprudential policies throughout the world. This raises important questions for monetary policy. What, if any, is the relationship between monetary and macroprudential policies? In particular, how does the effectiveness of macroprudential policies (or lack thereof) influence the conduct of monetary policy? This discussion paper builds on the insights of recent theoretical and empirical research to address these questions.
{"title":"On the Interaction between Monetary and Macroprudential Policies","authors":"Alberto Martín, Caterina Mendicino, Alejandro Van der Ghote","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3797147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3797147","url":null,"abstract":"The Global Financial Crisis fostered the design and adoption of macroprudential policies throughout the world. This raises important questions for monetary policy. What, if any, is the relationship between monetary and macroprudential policies? In particular, how does the effectiveness of macroprudential policies (or lack thereof) influence the conduct of monetary policy? This discussion paper builds on the insights of recent theoretical and empirical research to address these questions.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"69 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131844748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The interest in banks’ bankruptcy prediction has rapidly increased especially after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. The relevant consequences of bankruptcy cases have indeed highlighted the necessity for managers and regulators to develop and adopt appropriate early warning systems. The purpose of this paper is therefore to conduct a literature review of recent empirical contributions on bank’s default prediction by analyzing three underlying aspects: definition of default and financial distress, application of statistical and intelligent techniques, variables selection. The review also proposes some possible upgrades to promote future research on the topic, i.e. pointing out the potential role of non-financial information as good default predictors.
{"title":"Bank Failures: Review and Comparison of Prediction Models","authors":"A. Citterio","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3719997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3719997","url":null,"abstract":"The interest in banks’ bankruptcy prediction has rapidly increased especially after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. The relevant consequences of bankruptcy cases have indeed highlighted the necessity for managers and regulators to develop and adopt appropriate early warning systems. The purpose of this paper is therefore to conduct a literature review of recent empirical contributions on bank’s default prediction by analyzing three underlying aspects: definition of default and financial distress, application of statistical and intelligent techniques, variables selection. The review also proposes some possible upgrades to promote future research on the topic, i.e. pointing out the potential role of non-financial information as good default predictors.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123747089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies optimal bank capital requirements in a model of endogenous bank funding conditions. I find that requirements should be higher during good times such that a macroprudential “buffer” is provided. However, whether banks can use buffers to maintain lending during a financial crisis depends on the capital requirement during the subsequent recovery. The reason is that a high requirement during the recovery lowers bank shareholder value during the crisis and thus creates funding-market pressure to use buffers for deleveraging rather than for maintaining lending. Therefore, buffers are useful if banks are not required to rebuild them quickly.
{"title":"Macroprudential Policy with Capital Buffers","authors":"Josef Schroth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3779302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3779302","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies optimal bank capital requirements in a model of endogenous bank funding conditions. I find that requirements should be higher during good times such that a macroprudential “buffer” is provided. However, whether banks can use buffers to maintain lending during a financial crisis depends on the capital requirement during the subsequent recovery. The reason is that a high requirement during the recovery lowers bank shareholder value during the crisis and thus creates funding-market pressure to use buffers for deleveraging rather than for maintaining lending. Therefore, buffers are useful if banks are not required to rebuild them quickly.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121575136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent episodes of stress in the financial system have fostered a great deal of discussion regarding new supervisory and regulatory tools for financial institutions. The recent introduction of additional capital requirements for systemically important financial institutions is one example of the concrete measures that are being taken by regulators to mitigate systemic risk. In order to assist market participants in assessing and tracking systemic risk in the financial system, the Volatility Laboratory of the NYU Stern School of Business developed a quantitative indicator, called SRISK, which estimates the expected capital shortfall faced by a firm in a potential future financial crisis. Conceptually, SRISK is similar to the stress tests that are regularly applied to financial institutions; however, it is based exclusively on publicly available information (market and accounting data) and is quick and inexpensive to compute. Those firms with a high capital shortfall in a crisis – that is, when capital is low in the financial system – are the ones with the potential to extend the crisis and impact the broader economy. We use SRISK to quantify the estimated capital shortfalls of financial institutions under three relevant stress events that occurred in 2016: Brexit, the Trump election and the Italian referendum. We refer to these events collectively as BRUMPIT. Our empirical results confirm the usefulness of SRISK in assessing the sensitivity of individual financial institutions to the BRUMPIT events. This highlights the transmission channels in terms of systemic risk.
{"title":"Systemic Risk in the Financial System: Capital Shortfalls Under Brexit, the US Elections and the Italian Referendum","authors":"R. Engle, Cristiano Zazzara","doi":"10.21314/JCR.2018.247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21314/JCR.2018.247","url":null,"abstract":"Recent episodes of stress in the financial system have fostered a great deal of discussion regarding new supervisory and regulatory tools for financial institutions. The recent introduction of additional capital requirements for systemically important financial institutions is one example of the concrete measures that are being taken by regulators to mitigate systemic risk. In order to assist market participants in assessing and tracking systemic risk in the financial system, the Volatility Laboratory of the NYU Stern School of Business developed a quantitative indicator, called SRISK, which estimates the expected capital shortfall faced by a firm in a potential future financial crisis. Conceptually, SRISK is similar to the stress tests that are regularly applied to financial institutions; however, it is based exclusively on publicly available information (market and accounting data) and is quick and inexpensive to compute. Those firms with a high capital shortfall in a crisis – that is, when capital is low in the financial system – are the ones with the potential to extend the crisis and impact the broader economy. We use SRISK to quantify the estimated capital shortfalls of financial institutions under three relevant stress events that occurred in 2016: Brexit, the Trump election and the Italian referendum. We refer to these events collectively as BRUMPIT. Our empirical results confirm the usefulness of SRISK in assessing the sensitivity of individual financial institutions to the BRUMPIT events. This highlights the transmission channels in terms of systemic risk.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114357374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The core principles of financial crisis management call upon central banks to lend freely, against good quality collateral, and at a penalty rate of interest, to solvent but illiquid banks and other financial institutions. While often taken for granted, these principles were designed for a world in which central banks have the capacity to create money denominated in the domestic currency, and where banks and other financial institutions issue deposits and other short-term liabilities denominated in the same currency. Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. The application of these principles is far from straightforward where financial institutions rely on short-term foreign currency liabilities as a source of financing. This is the world of the Eurodollar market. The global financial crisis vividly illustrated the potential systemic risks arising from the existence of a large Eurodollar market. Faced with a systemic foreign currency liquidity crisis, central banks struggled to secure access to the foreign currency reserves needed to provide emergency liquidity assistance to their domestic banking systems. In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve and other major central banks established a network of swap lines with the objective of providing foreign currency liquidity assistance to the international financial system. The central bank swap lines have been hailed as one of the most important and effective policy responses to the financial crisis. However, while it may be tempting to view them as an effective prophylactic against future foreign currency liquidity crises, the current structure of the swap lines fails to establish truly credible international commitments or constrain the moral hazard problems stemming from this ambitious form of state-sponsored liquidity insurance. This paper examines the unique policy challenges posed by foreign currency liquidity problems, along with how to build a more effective framework for the provision of foreign currency liquidity assistance.
{"title":"Brother, Can You Spare a Dollar? Designing an Effective Framework for Foreign Currency Liquidity Assistance","authors":"Dan Awrey","doi":"10.7916/D8-W0HE-GC60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8-W0HE-GC60","url":null,"abstract":"The core principles of financial crisis management call upon central banks to lend freely, against good quality collateral, and at a penalty rate of interest, to solvent but illiquid banks and other financial institutions. While often taken for granted, these principles were designed for a world in which central banks have the capacity to create money denominated in the domestic currency, and where banks and other financial institutions issue deposits and other short-term liabilities denominated in the same currency. \u0000Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. The application of these principles is far from straightforward where financial institutions rely on short-term foreign currency liabilities as a source of financing. This is the world of the Eurodollar market. The global financial crisis vividly illustrated the potential systemic risks arising from the existence of a large Eurodollar market. Faced with a systemic foreign currency liquidity crisis, central banks struggled to secure access to the foreign currency reserves needed to provide emergency liquidity assistance to their domestic banking systems. In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve and other major central banks established a network of swap lines with the objective of providing foreign currency liquidity assistance to the international financial system. \u0000The central bank swap lines have been hailed as one of the most important and effective policy responses to the financial crisis. However, while it may be tempting to view them as an effective prophylactic against future foreign currency liquidity crises, the current structure of the swap lines fails to establish truly credible international commitments or constrain the moral hazard problems stemming from this ambitious form of state-sponsored liquidity insurance. This paper examines the unique policy challenges posed by foreign currency liquidity problems, along with how to build a more effective framework for the provision of foreign currency liquidity assistance.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122911017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-26DOI: 10.4337/9781785362637.00011
Jay Cullen
The repo market is a major source of short-term secured funding for financial institutions. Because lending in these markets is collateralized – often by high-quality securities – the stability of the market was, until recently, taken for granted by market participants and regulators. However, in common with other forms of secured lending, repo markets may break down if concerns about collateral values become widespread, and cause participants to withdraw funding. Many contend that a run on the repo market was a central driver of the global financial crisis. And yet, direct reform of the repo market has not been prioritized. This chapter critically analyses post-crisis regulation of the repo market and argues that whilst direct reform of repo has indeed been lacking, other reforms aimed at curbing financial institutions’ reliance on short-term funding sources and capping bank balance sheets will limit the threat repo markets pose to systemic stability.
{"title":"The Repo Market, Collateral and Systemic Risk: In Search of Regulatory Coherence","authors":"Jay Cullen","doi":"10.4337/9781785362637.00011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785362637.00011","url":null,"abstract":"The repo market is a major source of short-term secured funding for financial institutions. Because lending in these markets is collateralized – often by high-quality securities – the stability of the market was, until recently, taken for granted by market participants and regulators. However, in common with other forms of secured lending, repo markets may break down if concerns about collateral values become widespread, and cause participants to withdraw funding. Many contend that a run on the repo market was a central driver of the global financial crisis. And yet, direct reform of the repo market has not been prioritized. This chapter critically analyses post-crisis regulation of the repo market and argues that whilst direct reform of repo has indeed been lacking, other reforms aimed at curbing financial institutions’ reliance on short-term funding sources and capping bank balance sheets will limit the threat repo markets pose to systemic stability.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"57 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116573254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the global financial crisis, Asian regulators have strived to curb the misselling of wealth management products by strengthening product disclosure, enhancing suitability assessments and conducting product intervention. However, much less attention has been paid to financial institutions’ post-contractual duties after selling a product. This article examines various issues that might arise during the post-contractual stage of a structured wealth management product, which may include a margin call, notification of a material adverse event and advice on redemption or settlement. By drawing on product documentation available in the public domain, disputes occurring in various jurisdictions and relevant judicial decisions, this article suggests that there could be a potential gap between contractual protection and regulatory rules in the post-contractual stage that we should further elaborate upon to clarify the rights and obligations of financial institutions and their customers.
{"title":"Post-Contractual Duties of Financial Institutions Regarding Wealth Management Products","authors":"Christopher C. Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2920444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920444","url":null,"abstract":"Since the global financial crisis, Asian regulators have strived to curb the misselling of wealth management products by strengthening product disclosure, enhancing suitability assessments and conducting product intervention. However, much less attention has been paid to financial institutions’ post-contractual duties after selling a product. This article examines various issues that might arise during the post-contractual stage of a structured wealth management product, which may include a margin call, notification of a material adverse event and advice on redemption or settlement. By drawing on product documentation available in the public domain, disputes occurring in various jurisdictions and relevant judicial decisions, this article suggests that there could be a potential gap between contractual protection and regulatory rules in the post-contractual stage that we should further elaborate upon to clarify the rights and obligations of financial institutions and their customers.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121509543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article revisits the IS-LM macroeconomic model by incorporating speculation into the investment function. The discussion is supported empirically by using data from the G7 countries to examine the different interest rate regimes in the pre- and post-2008 financial crisis. The estimation of an ‘anchor’ interest rate provides a reference rate for the G7 countries. The empirical study is extended to examine if the three quantitative easing (QE) episodes in the U.S. are growth promoting. The article concludes that the maintenance of a high and stable interest rate policy is needed for sustainable growth in the G7 countries.
{"title":"Is There an 'Interest Rate - Speculation' Relationship? Evidence from G7 in the Pre- and Post-2008 Crisis","authors":"Kui-wai Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2832513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2832513","url":null,"abstract":"The article revisits the IS-LM macroeconomic model by incorporating speculation into the investment function. The discussion is supported empirically by using data from the G7 countries to examine the different interest rate regimes in the pre- and post-2008 financial crisis. The estimation of an ‘anchor’ interest rate provides a reference rate for the G7 countries. The empirical study is extended to examine if the three quantitative easing (QE) episodes in the U.S. are growth promoting. The article concludes that the maintenance of a high and stable interest rate policy is needed for sustainable growth in the G7 countries.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131420322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Peters, P. Shevchenko, Bertrand K. Hassani, Ariane Chapelle
Recently, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision proposed to replace all approaches, including Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), for operational risk capital with a simple formula referred to as the Standardised Measurement Approach (SMA). This paper discusses and studies the weaknesses and pitfalls of SMA such as instability, risk insensitivity, super-additivity and the implicit relationship between SMA capital model and systemic risk in the banking sector. We also discuss the issues with closely related operational risk Capital-at-Risk (OpCar) Basel Committee proposed model which is the precursor to the SMA. In conclusion, we advocate to maintain the AMA internal model framework and suggest as an alternative a number of standardization recommendations that could be considered to unify internal modelling of operational risk. The findings and views presented in this paper have been discussed with and supported by many OpRisk practitioners and academics in Australia, Europe, UK and USA, and recently at OpRisk Europe 2016 conference in London.
{"title":"Should the Advanced Measurement Approach be Replaced with the Standardized Measurement Approach for Operational Risk?","authors":"G. Peters, P. Shevchenko, Bertrand K. Hassani, Ariane Chapelle","doi":"10.21314/JOP.2016.177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21314/JOP.2016.177","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision proposed to replace all approaches, including Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), for operational risk capital with a simple formula referred to as the Standardised Measurement Approach (SMA). This paper discusses and studies the weaknesses and pitfalls of SMA such as instability, risk insensitivity, super-additivity and the implicit relationship between SMA capital model and systemic risk in the banking sector. We also discuss the issues with closely related operational risk Capital-at-Risk (OpCar) Basel Committee proposed model which is the precursor to the SMA. In conclusion, we advocate to maintain the AMA internal model framework and suggest as an alternative a number of standardization recommendations that could be considered to unify internal modelling of operational risk. The findings and views presented in this paper have been discussed with and supported by many OpRisk practitioners and academics in Australia, Europe, UK and USA, and recently at OpRisk Europe 2016 conference in London.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125176668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The supervisory guidelines for the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's Advanced Measurement Approaches require the uncertainty of operational risk capital to be acknowledged by financial institutions. The estimated capital charge is inherently uncertain due to the heaviness and scarcity of operational risk losses in the tail region. Beyond the regulatory requirements, we build on this sound quantitative information to provide the bank with relevant business applications: a hybrid capital model with balanced weighting between backward-looking and forward-looking risk information; scenario bias mitigation; and managing future capital-based risk appetite limits for scenario topics. Making businesses sensitive to the sources of capital uncertainty will help reduce inherent uncertainty by identifying ways to develop scenario analysis coverage in line with the internal and external business environment assessment outcomes. Looking at capital uncertainty from a scenario topic perspective is really sensible and appealing. Transparency on capital uncertainty within the business helps to manage expectation on model noise against what remains actionable.
{"title":"How to Turn Uncertainties of Operational Risk Capital into Opportunities from a Risk Management Perspective","authors":"Philippe P. Meunier, A. Bakker","doi":"10.21314/JOP.2016.175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21314/JOP.2016.175","url":null,"abstract":"The supervisory guidelines for the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's Advanced Measurement Approaches require the uncertainty of operational risk capital to be acknowledged by financial institutions. The estimated capital charge is inherently uncertain due to the heaviness and scarcity of operational risk losses in the tail region. Beyond the regulatory requirements, we build on this sound quantitative information to provide the bank with relevant business applications: a hybrid capital model with balanced weighting between backward-looking and forward-looking risk information; scenario bias mitigation; and managing future capital-based risk appetite limits for scenario topics. Making businesses sensitive to the sources of capital uncertainty will help reduce inherent uncertainty by identifying ways to develop scenario analysis coverage in line with the internal and external business environment assessment outcomes. Looking at capital uncertainty from a scenario topic perspective is really sensible and appealing. Transparency on capital uncertainty within the business helps to manage expectation on model noise against what remains actionable.","PeriodicalId":351643,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: International Financial Flows","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131295116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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