非常简单的马尔可夫完美产业动态:理论

ERN: Monopoly Pub Date : 2017-03-31 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2945407
J. Abbring, Jeffrey R. Campbell, J. Tilly, N. Yang
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引用次数: 10

摘要

本文建立了寡头垄断市场中企业进入、竞争和退出的简单模型。它以竞争的韧性、沉没进入成本、市场层面的需求和成本冲击为特征,但假设企业在做出进入和生存决策时的预期回报是相同的。我们证明了该模型具有本质上唯一的对称马尔可夫完美均衡,并给出了其计算算法。由于该算法只需要找到有限序列的不动点,保证了收敛速度快。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: Theory
This paper develops a simple model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. It features toughness of competition, sunk entry costs, and market-level demand and cost shocks, but assumes that firms' expected payoffs are identical when entry and survival decisions are made. We prove that this model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, and we provide an algorithm for its computation. Because this algorithm only requires finding the fixed points of a finite sequence of contraction mappings, it is guaranteed to converge quickly.
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