只有站立的空间:为什么第四修正案排除和站立不能在逻辑上共存

S. F. Colb
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引用次数: 0

摘要

只有站立的空间:为什么第四修正案排除和站立不能再逻辑共存认为第四修正案的站立原则与现有的第四修正案排除规则从根本上是不相容的。第四修正案规定,只有当一个人的正常合理的隐私预期受到侵犯时,考虑到警察可能甚至不知道她的情况(包括她是否拥有被搜查的财产),才可以隐瞒警察因违反第四修正案而出现的证据。与此同时,现有的排除规则原则坚持认为,第四修正案压制的唯一目的是激励警察在掌握事实(例如他们是否有可能的原因)的情况下,使他们的行为符合禁止不合理搜查和扣押的法律。本文提出,在评估被告提起查禁动议的资格时,考虑到被告的实际情况,认为她对搜查发生地的财产拥有(或不拥有)所有权,而忽视了她在该财产内从事犯罪活动的事实,是武断的。因此,本文的结论是,在确定警察是否有不当行为(因此需要通过排除来阻止)时所涉及的事前观点,在逻辑上与在评估寻求压制的人是否实际上有权继续免于发现不利于她的证据的搜查时所涉及的事后观点不一致。这篇文章仔细研究了明尼苏达州诉卡特案,作为这种教义不连贯的完美例证。
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Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist
Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist argues that the Fourth Amendment standing doctrine is fundamentally incompatible with the existing Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Fourth Amendment standing provides that only a person who has suffered an invasion of her own normatively reasonable expectations of privacy, given the facts about her situation that police may not even know (including whether she owns the property searched), may suppress evidence that police turned up through a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Meanwhile, the existing exclusionary rule doctrine maintains that the sole objective of Fourth Amendment suppression is to motivate police officers, given facts available to them (such as whether they have probable cause), to conform their conduct to the law prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. This Article proposes that by taking into account the actual facts about the defendant’s situation in assessing her standing to bring a suppression motion, it is arbitrary to consider the fact that she did (or did not) have an ownership right in the property where the search occurred, while simultaneously ignoring the fact that she was engaged in criminal activity within that property. This Article accordingly concludes that the ex ante perspective involved in determining whether the police have misbehaved (and thus need to be deterred through exclusion), is logically at odds with the ex post perspective involved in assessing whether the person seeking suppression was in fact entitled to remain free of the search that uncovered evidence against her. The Article takes a close look at the case of Minnesota v. Carter as a perfect illustration of this doctrinal incoherence.
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