把苍蝇从瓶子里拿出来:自由意志和决定论的错误问题

P. Westen
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引用次数: 11

摘要

自由意志和决定论被认为是哲学史上被写得最多的问题,这个问题每年都在主要大学出版社出版,每一本都声称对道德和刑事责任有深刻的见解。评论家们对这个问题的看法大相径庭,有的人接受自由意志而拒绝决定论,有的人接受决定论而拒绝自由意志,有的人两者都拒绝,有的人两者都接受,包括那些通过重新定义什么是自由意志而接受的人。然而,尽管存在分歧,评论家们似乎在一件事上达成了一致:他们一致认为,自由意志和决定论之间的关系是形而上学和道德中的一个真正的问题,也就是说,至少在理论上,证据、分析、想象和智力都能够解决这个问题。相反,我认为自由意志和决定论之间的关系是一个错误的问题,也就是说,一个我们无法解决的问题,即使在理论上也是如此。这是一个我们为自己构建的问题——或者,更准确地说,是一个为我们解释的问题——因为它是我们在反思它时不得不承担的相互矛盾的思维方式的产物。自由意志和决定论是关于世界的假设,它们与我们必须据此进行推理的前提不一致。因此,决定论是一种关于物理物体和事件(包括我们自己)本质的因果假设,它与我们断言它是正确的理性和知识的前提不一致。反过来,自由意志是一种解释理性和有意行为的努力,因为它们是物理上无原因的,这与解释本身的性质不一致。对错误问题的正确回应不是寻找进一步的证据或努力进行更好的分析。对错误的问题,包括自由意志和决定论的问题,正确的反应是停止思考它。
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Getting the Fly out of the Bottle: The False Problem of Free Will and Determinism
Free will and determinism are said to constitute the most written-about problem in the history of philosophy, one that continues every year to produce major publications by major university presses, each claiming insight into moral and criminal responsibility. Commentators differ sharply in their approaches to the problem, ranging over those who embrace free will and reject determinism, those who embrace determinism and reject free will, those who reject both, and those who embrace both, including those who do so by virtue of redefining what counts as free will. Yet despite their disagreements, commentators seem to agree about one thing: they agree that the relationship between free will and determinism is a genuine problem in metaphysics and morals, that is, a problem that evidence, analysis, imagination, intelligence are capable of resolving, at least in theory. I argue, in contrast, that the relationship between free will and determinism is a false problem, that is, a problem that we are incapable of resolving, even in theory. It is a problem that we have constructed for ourselves - or, perhaps, more accurately, a problem that has been construed for us - because it is the product of contradictory modes of thought that we are obliged to bring to bear in reflecting upon it. Free will and determinism are hypotheses about the world that are inconsistent with presuppositions by which we must reason about them. Thus, determinism is a causal hypothesis regarding the nature of physical bodies and events, including ourselves, that is inconsistent with the presuppositions of reason and knowledge by which we assert it to be true. Free will, in turn, is an effort to explain reason and intentional conduct as being physically uncaused that is inconsistent with the nature of explanation itself. The proper response to a false problem is not to search for further evidence or to strive for better analysis. The proper response to a false problem, including that of free will and determinism, is to stop thinking about it.
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