{"title":"增兵还是不增兵","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0032","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the concept of loss aversion to explain why it took the U.S. government so long to change their strategy. Loss aversion created the desire to preserve perceived gains and resist changes in strategy that could place them at risk – even as the cost of the current policy was high, and its prospects of success were low. Only when the Bush administration accepted that the current plan would guarantee a loss and a new approach could result in a win at acceptable cost was it able to revise its strategy.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"To Surge or Not to Surge\",\"authors\":\"Christopher D. Kolenda\",\"doi\":\"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0032\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter introduces the concept of loss aversion to explain why it took the U.S. government so long to change their strategy. Loss aversion created the desire to preserve perceived gains and resist changes in strategy that could place them at risk – even as the cost of the current policy was high, and its prospects of success were low. Only when the Bush administration accepted that the current plan would guarantee a loss and a new approach could result in a win at acceptable cost was it able to revise its strategy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":235305,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0032\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Zero-Sum Victory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0032","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter introduces the concept of loss aversion to explain why it took the U.S. government so long to change their strategy. Loss aversion created the desire to preserve perceived gains and resist changes in strategy that could place them at risk – even as the cost of the current policy was high, and its prospects of success were low. Only when the Bush administration accepted that the current plan would guarantee a loss and a new approach could result in a win at acceptable cost was it able to revise its strategy.