为糟糕的交易辩护

Tess Wilkinson‐Ryan
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在过去的十年里,心理学和行为学研究发现,个人对契约的承诺超越了个人关系和传统的承诺。即使是“接受或放弃”的消费者合同也会得到消费者的尊重——即使条款是不可执行的,即使同意在程序上是妥协的,即使起草者是一个非个人的商业行为者。事实上,越来越多的证据表明,人们将承诺的道德引入到可能被描述为掠夺性、剥削性或强制性的情况中。本文的目的是提出一个框架,以理解通过未读条款似乎被广泛接受的监管。我把这种现象称为“术语服从”——即人们服从术语,即使是敷衍的同意,即使是不公平的术语。我提出的框架是一种动机推理解释:当相信合同是公平的、同意是可靠的感觉更好时,人们更有可能持有这些信念。为了预测契约公平在什么时候会在心理上特别紧迫,我参考了大量心理学文献,研究人们是更倾向于相信一个公正的世界,还是对现状感到满意。当一种现象或一种制度显得不可调和和不可避免时,相信这种制度是好的心理压力就会减少。“系统辩护”是一种有充分证据证明的心理现象,它预测了个人何时会被激励持守支持现状的信念,即使现状对他们不利。本文报道的两项研究通过改变术语的可执行性、后果和历史,操纵了支持现状的压力——相信公司是合理的,合同法是公平的。研究结果显示了预测的模式,即支持现状的心理压力增加,会增加人们对现状良好和公平的信念。这些结果也与预测一致,即维持现状的压力不仅是一种心理状态,也是一种特质。这一特征与政治保守主义密切相关,结果表明,在政治上更保守的受试者中,有更强的动机为现状辩护。这里的结果不仅对合同法有影响,而且对我们如何理解法律决策中的自身利益,以及对同意和遵守的法律理解也有影响。
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Justifying Bad Deals
In the past decade, psychological and behavioral studies have found that individual commitment to contracts persists beyond personal relationships and traditional promises. Even take-it-or-leave it consumer contracts get substantial deference from consumers — even when the terms are unenforceable, even when the assent is procedurally compromised, and even when the drafter is an impersonal commercial actor. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that people import the morality of promise into situations that might otherwise be described as predatory, exploitative, or coercive. The purpose of this Article is to propose a framework for understanding what seems to be widespread acceptance of regulation via unread terms. I refer to this phenomenon as “term deference” — the finding that people defer to the term, even when the assent is perfunctory, and even when the term is unfair.

The framework I propose is a motivated reasoning explanation: when it feels better to believe that contracts are fair and that assent is reliable, people are more likely to hold those beliefs. In order to predict when contractual fairness will be especially psychologically urgent, I draw on an extensive body of psychological literature on the preference for believing in a just world, or for being satisfied with the status quo. When a phenomenon or a system appears implacable and unavoidable, it is psychologically less stressful to believe that the system is good. “System justification” is a well-documented psychological phenomenon that predicts when individuals will be motivated to hold beliefs that support the status quo, even when the status quo redounds to their own disadvantage. The two studies reported here manipulate the pressure to support the status quo — to believe that firms are reasonable and contract law is fair — by varying the term’s enforceability, its consequences, and its history. The findings show the predicted patterns, that increased psychological pressure to support the status quo increases beliefs that the status quo is good and fair. These results also align with the prediction that pressure to justify the status quo is not only a psychological state, but also a trait. That trait, highly associated with political conservatism, is reflected in the results suggesting a stronger motivation to justify the status quo among subjects who report that they are more politically conservative. The results here have implications not only for contract law, but also for how we understand self-interest in legal decision-making, and for the legal understandings of consent and compliance.
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