This paper, which is not a standalone document, is the web appendix referenced in Chris William Sanchirico, The Ramsey Rule at 100: Pairing Back the Overgrowth, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, Institute for Law and Economics, Research Paper no. 21-25, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925625. For ease of reference the heading structure of this appendix matches that in the main paper.
本文并非独立文件，是Chris William Sanchirico在《the Ramsey Rule at 100: pair Back the Overgrowth》中引用的网络附录，宾夕法尼亚大学凯里法学院，法律与经济研究所，研究论文号:21 - 25日,https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925625。为了便于参考，本附录的标题结构与主论文的标题结构一致。
{"title":"Web Appendix to 'The Ramsey Rule at 100: Pairing Back the Overgrowth'","authors":"C. Sanchirico","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3925626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3925626","url":null,"abstract":"This paper, which is not a standalone document, is the web appendix referenced in Chris William Sanchirico, The Ramsey Rule at 100: Pairing Back the Overgrowth, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, Institute for Law and Economics, Research Paper no. 21-25, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925625. For ease of reference the heading structure of this appendix matches that in the main paper.","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126238528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The implications of COVID developments for monetary policy will certainly extend beyond the increased use of digital platforms and payments. The current environment is also focused on smart green techniques and green initiatives aimed at promoting a transition to a net zero based carbon emissions economy. During the onset of the pandemic, it was initially thought that carbon emissions would fall drastically – given the impact of the pandemic, not only on the airlines industry, but also as a result of “Stay at Home” measures imposed by jurisdictions, which even made it illegal to drive to certain places, where purposes for doing so were unjustified. However, the pandemic has also witnessed unprecedented levels in digital subscriptions, online sales and marketing – also fueled through digital payments and the use of digital platforms and distributed ledger technologies in facilitating cashless payments – cash, namely bank notes and coins, also being considered to be a medium of COVID transmission. Coupled with attributes such speed, convenience and ease, the need for financial inclusion has also become an objective in facilitating the era of innovative digital means of payments.As well as considering the current implications of measures that have been instigated to address the impacts of the pandemic, drawing from past and current lessons from selected jurisdictions, this paper also considers why the transition to a net zero carbon economy may prove more challenging than may first appear. However, jurisdictional differences and historical developments will play a part in determining how sustainable certain implemented policies and measures are – as well as in facilitating a transition to normality.This presentation will seek to demonstrate that depending on the structure of financial regulation which operates in different jurisdictions, as well as whether common law principles of tort law apply in these jurisdictions in addressing liability risks, it will be feasible, realistic and possible to break the tragedy of the horizon.
{"title":"Assessing COVID Impacts, Sustainable Finance, Current and Future Implications for Banks and Monetary Policy: 'Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon, Climate Change and Financial Stability'","authors":"Marianne Ojo D Delaney PhD","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3912349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912349","url":null,"abstract":"The implications of COVID developments for monetary policy will certainly extend beyond the increased use of digital platforms and payments. The current environment is also focused on smart green techniques and green initiatives aimed at promoting a transition to a net zero based carbon emissions economy. During the onset of the pandemic, it was initially thought that carbon emissions would fall drastically – given the impact of the pandemic, not only on the airlines industry, but also as a result of “Stay at Home” measures imposed by jurisdictions, which even made it illegal to drive to certain places, where purposes for doing so were unjustified. However, the pandemic has also witnessed unprecedented levels in digital subscriptions, online sales and marketing – also fueled through digital payments and the use of digital platforms and distributed ledger technologies in facilitating cashless payments – cash, namely bank notes and coins, also being considered to be a medium of COVID transmission. Coupled with attributes such speed, convenience and ease, the need for financial inclusion has also become an objective in facilitating the era of innovative digital means of payments.As well as considering the current implications of measures that have been instigated to address the impacts of the pandemic, drawing from past and current lessons from selected jurisdictions, this paper also considers why the transition to a net zero carbon economy may prove more challenging than may first appear. However, jurisdictional differences and historical developments will play a part in determining how sustainable certain implemented policies and measures are – as well as in facilitating a transition to normality.This presentation will seek to demonstrate that depending on the structure of financial regulation which operates in different jurisdictions, as well as whether common law principles of tort law apply in these jurisdictions in addressing liability risks, it will be feasible, realistic and possible to break the tragedy of the horizon.","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126226288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 1990, Egypt started in collaboration with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural economic reforms aiming at following the track of a market-oriented economy rather than its four-decade state-directed one. As a result, there was a need to reconsider the role of government in such an economic system; many questions were raised on the scope of government intervention and the mechanisms of such interventions. One of the most vital questions was how the government would be able to develop a competitive market where government-business policies are fair and just, access by new market players is not risky, exit from the market is not a source of distortion, and consumers rights of wide-located and diversified-based market products are maintained.
It seems that the final outcome of such a debate was the adoption of the Law No. 3 of 2005 on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Antitrust Practices which first established The Competition Protection Authority known as The Egyptian Competition Authority “ECA” as an independent authority with financial autonomy.
Having said that, the political economy perspective of the competition law, governance, and policy is too extensive to be covered by one paper. Thus, this paper, after offering an overview of the Political Economy Constitutional Preferences and the Constitutional Framework of the Regulatory Agencies in Egypt, is mainly focusing on answering the following two questions:
1- What are the political economy circumstances in which the ECA evolved?
2- Where does the ECA stand from the financial autonomy?
{"title":"A Political Economy Perspective of The Egyptian Competition Authority","authors":"Eslam M. Saleh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3630611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3630611","url":null,"abstract":"In 1990, Egypt started in collaboration with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural economic reforms aiming at following the track of a market-oriented economy rather than its four-decade state-directed one. As a result, there was a need to reconsider the role of government in such an economic system; many questions were raised on the scope of government intervention and the mechanisms of such interventions. One of the most vital questions was how the government would be able to develop a competitive market where government-business policies are fair and just, access by new market players is not risky, exit from the market is not a source of distortion, and consumers rights of wide-located and diversified-based market products are maintained. <br><br>It seems that the final outcome of such a debate was the adoption of the Law No. 3 of 2005 on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Antitrust Practices which first established The Competition Protection Authority known as The Egyptian Competition Authority “ECA” as an independent authority with financial autonomy. <br><br>Having said that, the political economy perspective of the competition law, governance, and policy is too extensive to be covered by one paper. Thus, this paper, after offering an overview of the Political Economy Constitutional Preferences and the Constitutional Framework of the Regulatory Agencies in Egypt, is mainly focusing on answering the following two questions:<br><br>1- What are the political economy circumstances in which the ECA evolved?<br><br>2- Where does the ECA stand from the financial autonomy?","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132167190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent influential work finds large increases in inequality in the U.S., based on measures of wealth concentration that notably exclude the value of social insurance programs. This paper revisits this conclusion by incorporating Social Security retirement benefits into measures of wealth inequality. Wealth inequality has not increased in the last three decades when Social Security is accounted for. This finding is robust to assumptions about how taxes and benefits may change in response to system financing concerns. When discounted at the risk-free rate, real Social Security wealth increased substantially from $4.8 trillion in 1989 to just over $41.3 trillion in 2016. When we adjust for systematic risk coming from the covariance of Social Security returns with the market portfolio, this increase remains sizable, growing from over $3.9 trillion in 1989 to $33.9 trillion in 2016. Consequently, by 2016, Social Security wealth represented 57% of the wealth of the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution. We conclude that Social Security represents the main source of savings for most Americans. Measures of inequality that exclude it are misleading.
{"title":"Social Security and Trends in Wealth Inequality","authors":"S. Catherine, Max Miller, Natasha Sarin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3546668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3546668","url":null,"abstract":"Recent influential work finds large increases in inequality in the U.S., based on measures of wealth concentration that notably exclude the value of social insurance programs. This paper revisits this conclusion by incorporating Social Security retirement benefits into measures of wealth inequality. Wealth inequality has not increased in the last three decades when Social Security is accounted for. This finding is robust to assumptions about how taxes and benefits may change in response to system financing concerns. When discounted at the risk-free rate, real Social Security wealth increased substantially from $4.8 trillion in 1989 to just over $41.3 trillion in 2016. When we adjust for systematic risk coming from the covariance of Social Security returns with the market portfolio, this increase remains sizable, growing from over $3.9 trillion in 1989 to $33.9 trillion in 2016. Consequently, by 2016, Social Security wealth represented 57% of the wealth of the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution. We conclude that Social Security represents the main source of savings for most Americans. Measures of inequality that exclude it are misleading.","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115575677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the past decade, psychological and behavioral studies have found that individual commitment to contracts persists beyond personal relationships and traditional promises. Even take-it-or-leave it consumer contracts get substantial deference from consumers — even when the terms are unenforceable, even when the assent is procedurally compromised, and even when the drafter is an impersonal commercial actor. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that people import the morality of promise into situations that might otherwise be described as predatory, exploitative, or coercive. The purpose of this Article is to propose a framework for understanding what seems to be widespread acceptance of regulation via unread terms. I refer to this phenomenon as “term deference” — the finding that people defer to the term, even when the assent is perfunctory, and even when the term is unfair.
The framework I propose is a motivated reasoning explanation: when it feels better to believe that contracts are fair and that assent is reliable, people are more likely to hold those beliefs. In order to predict when contractual fairness will be especially psychologically urgent, I draw on an extensive body of psychological literature on the preference for believing in a just world, or for being satisfied with the status quo. When a phenomenon or a system appears implacable and unavoidable, it is psychologically less stressful to believe that the system is good. “System justification” is a well-documented psychological phenomenon that predicts when individuals will be motivated to hold beliefs that support the status quo, even when the status quo redounds to their own disadvantage. The two studies reported here manipulate the pressure to support the status quo — to believe that firms are reasonable and contract law is fair — by varying the term’s enforceability, its consequences, and its history. The findings show the predicted patterns, that increased psychological pressure to support the status quo increases beliefs that the status quo is good and fair. These results also align with the prediction that pressure to justify the status quo is not only a psychological state, but also a trait. That trait, highly associated with political conservatism, is reflected in the results suggesting a stronger motivation to justify the status quo among subjects who report that they are more politically conservative. The results here have implications not only for contract law, but also for how we understand self-interest in legal decision-making, and for the legal understandings of consent and compliance.
{"title":"Justifying Bad Deals","authors":"Tess Wilkinson‐Ryan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3532442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3532442","url":null,"abstract":"In the past decade, psychological and behavioral studies have found that individual commitment to contracts persists beyond personal relationships and traditional promises. Even take-it-or-leave it consumer contracts get substantial deference from consumers — even when the terms are unenforceable, even when the assent is procedurally compromised, and even when the drafter is an impersonal commercial actor. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that people import the morality of promise into situations that might otherwise be described as predatory, exploitative, or coercive. The purpose of this Article is to propose a framework for understanding what seems to be widespread acceptance of regulation via unread terms. I refer to this phenomenon as “term deference” — the finding that people defer to the term, even when the assent is perfunctory, and even when the term is unfair. <br><br>The framework I propose is a motivated reasoning explanation: when it feels better to believe that contracts are fair and that assent is reliable, people are more likely to hold those beliefs. In order to predict when contractual fairness will be especially psychologically urgent, I draw on an extensive body of psychological literature on the preference for believing in a just world, or for being satisfied with the status quo. When a phenomenon or a system appears implacable and unavoidable, it is psychologically less stressful to believe that the system is good. “System justification” is a well-documented psychological phenomenon that predicts when individuals will be motivated to hold beliefs that support the status quo, even when the status quo redounds to their own disadvantage. The two studies reported here manipulate the pressure to support the status quo — to believe that firms are reasonable and contract law is fair — by varying the term’s enforceability, its consequences, and its history. The findings show the predicted patterns, that increased psychological pressure to support the status quo increases beliefs that the status quo is good and fair. These results also align with the prediction that pressure to justify the status quo is not only a psychological state, but also a trait. That trait, highly associated with political conservatism, is reflected in the results suggesting a stronger motivation to justify the status quo among subjects who report that they are more politically conservative. The results here have implications not only for contract law, but also for how we understand self-interest in legal decision-making, and for the legal understandings of consent and compliance.","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123445696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When are litigants' statistical estimates legally sufficient, given that courts use the preponderance of the evidence standard? We answer this question using Bayesian hypothesis testing and principles of federal procedural law, focusing on the common case of statistical estimation evidence from a normally distributed estimator. Our core result is that mathematical statistics and black-letter law combine to create a simple standard: statistical estimation evidence is legally sufficient when it fits the litigation position of the party relying on it. This means statistical estimation evidence is legally sufficient when the p-value is less than 0.5; equivalently, the preponderance standard is frequentist hypothesis testing with a significance level of just below 0.5. Finally, we show that conventional significance levels such as 0.05 require elevated standards of proof tantamount to clear-and-convincing or beyond-a-reasonable-doubt.
{"title":"Legal Sufficiency of Statistical Evidence","authors":"Jonah B. Gelbach, Bruce H. Kobayashi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3238793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3238793","url":null,"abstract":"When are litigants' statistical estimates legally sufficient, given that courts use the preponderance of the evidence standard? We answer this question using Bayesian hypothesis testing and principles of federal procedural law, focusing on the common case of statistical estimation evidence from a normally distributed estimator. \u0000Our core result is that mathematical statistics and black-letter law combine to create a simple standard: statistical estimation evidence is legally sufficient when it fits the litigation position of the party relying on it. This means statistical estimation evidence is legally sufficient when the p-value is less than 0.5; equivalently, the preponderance standard is frequentist hypothesis testing with a significance level of just below 0.5. \u0000Finally, we show that conventional significance levels such as 0.05 require elevated standards of proof tantamount to clear-and-convincing or beyond-a-reasonable-doubt.","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115550507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent FTC activities on Made in USA claims deserve revisiting Country of Origin Label and Made in USA claims cases with respect to international companies doing business abroad using American brand and outsourcing to manage production and labor costs.
{"title":"Country of Origin Relative to Made in the USA Label","authors":"Dorothy M Hong","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3034619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3034619","url":null,"abstract":"Recent FTC activities on Made in USA claims deserve revisiting Country of Origin Label and Made in USA claims cases with respect to international companies doing business abroad using American brand and outsourcing to manage production and labor costs.","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125651837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally refers to a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost savings or improvements in products or service. This article considers the current approach of merger enforcement policy to merger-induced efficiencies. Merger analysis today takes efficiencies into account in two ways. First, it makes assumptions about efficiencies in determining where the line for prima facie illegality should be drawn. Second, it recognizes an efficiencies "defense" once prima facie illegality has been established, with the burden of proof on the defendant. The rapidly growing empirical literature on post-merger performance suggests that merger policy today is more likely to permit an anticompetitive merger than to prohibit a harmless one. At the same time, however, the fault appears not to lie with the efficiencies defense. The defense has almost never successfully defended a merger after the government has made out a prima facie case of illegality. In that case the under deterrence problem must lie in the prima facie case itself. Welfare tradeoff models attempt to assess the welfare effects of mergers by comparing consumer harms and producer gains. One problem with the well known welfare tradeoff model developed by Oliver E. Williamson is that the efficiencies it contemplates occur at output levels that are lower than they were prior to the merger. While efficiencies at lower output levels are possible, they properly require additional proof. Of course, efficiencies might be so substantial that post-merger output is higher, and prices lower, than at premerger levels. But in that case there is nothing to trade off -- both producers and consumers would benefit from the merger. Williamson's model also assumed a market that was perfectly competitive prior to the merger but monopolized thereafter. Virtually no challenged mergers today fall into that territory. Most mergers occur in moderately concentrated markets where pre-merger prices are already substantially above marginal cost. In that case consumer welfare losses are much larger and efficiency gains must be spread over a much smaller output. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines also require that efficiencies be "merger specific" -- that is, that they could not reasonably be brought about except by the merger. Under a general welfare test that trades actual consumer losses against producer gains that approach makes sense, but u
当商业公司的合并威胁到减少竞争时，就违反了反垄断法。竞争通常指的是由于产量减少而导致的价格上涨。然而，威胁到竞争的合并也可能使合并后的公司降低成本或改进产品。对合并的态度在很大程度上是由对效率提高的假设所驱动的。如果竞争对手的合并从来没有产生效率的提高，而只是减少了竞争对手的数量，那么对它们的强烈推定将是有根据的。我们之所以容忍大多数的合并，是因为我们有一种背景，一种高度普遍的信念，即大多数或至少许多合并可以节省成本或改进产品或服务。本文考虑了当前并购执行政策对并购效率的影响。今天的合并分析从两个方面考虑了效率。首先，它对确定在何处划定初步非法的界线的效率作出了假设。其次，一旦初步认定违法，它承认一种有效的“辩护”，由被告承担举证责任。迅速增长的关于并购后表现的实证文献表明，如今的并购政策更有可能允许反竞争的并购，而不是禁止无害的并购。然而，与此同时，问题似乎不在于效率辩护。在政府提出一个初步的非法案例后，辩方几乎从来没有成功地为合并辩护过。在这种情况下，威慑力不足的问题必然在于初步证据本身。福利权衡模型试图通过比较消费者的损失和生产者的收益来评估合并的福利效应。奥利弗·e·威廉姆森(Oliver E. Williamson)提出的众所周知的福利权衡模型的一个问题是，它所考虑的效率发生在产出水平低于合并前的水平上。虽然在较低的产出水平上提高效率是可能的，但它们确实需要额外的证据。当然，效率可能是如此之高，以至于合并后的产出比合并前的水平更高，价格更低。但在这种情况下，没有什么可交换的——生产商和消费者都将从合并中受益。威廉姆森的模型还假设了一个完全竞争的市场，在合并之前是完全竞争的，但在合并之后是垄断的。如今，几乎没有任何有挑战的并购属于这一范畴。大多数合并发生在适度集中的市场，在那里合并前的价格已经大大高于边际成本。在这种情况下，消费者的福利损失要大得多，而效率的提高必须分摊到小得多的产出上。《2010年横向合并指南》还要求，效率必须是“特定于合并的”——也就是说，除非合并，否则效率不可能合理地产生。在以实际消费者损失和生产者收益为代价的一般福利测试下，这种方法是有道理的，但在《合并指南》适用的消费者福利测试下，这种方法就令人困惑了。首先，如果效率的大小不足以完全抵消任何价格上涨的倾向，那么无论所声称的效率是否是特定于合并的，效率抗辩都将被驳回。然而，如果效率实际上足够大，可以预测合并后的价格不会高于合并前的价格，那么我们为什么要关心呢?这样的合并不会损害消费者的利益，因此也不是反竞争的。
{"title":"Appraising Merger Efficiencies","authors":"Herbert Hovenkamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2664266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2664266","url":null,"abstract":"Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally refers to a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost savings or improvements in products or service. This article considers the current approach of merger enforcement policy to merger-induced efficiencies. Merger analysis today takes efficiencies into account in two ways. First, it makes assumptions about efficiencies in determining where the line for prima facie illegality should be drawn. Second, it recognizes an efficiencies \"defense\" once prima facie illegality has been established, with the burden of proof on the defendant. The rapidly growing empirical literature on post-merger performance suggests that merger policy today is more likely to permit an anticompetitive merger than to prohibit a harmless one. At the same time, however, the fault appears not to lie with the efficiencies defense. The defense has almost never successfully defended a merger after the government has made out a prima facie case of illegality. In that case the under deterrence problem must lie in the prima facie case itself. Welfare tradeoff models attempt to assess the welfare effects of mergers by comparing consumer harms and producer gains. One problem with the well known welfare tradeoff model developed by Oliver E. Williamson is that the efficiencies it contemplates occur at output levels that are lower than they were prior to the merger. While efficiencies at lower output levels are possible, they properly require additional proof. Of course, efficiencies might be so substantial that post-merger output is higher, and prices lower, than at premerger levels. But in that case there is nothing to trade off -- both producers and consumers would benefit from the merger. Williamson's model also assumed a market that was perfectly competitive prior to the merger but monopolized thereafter. Virtually no challenged mergers today fall into that territory. Most mergers occur in moderately concentrated markets where pre-merger prices are already substantially above marginal cost. In that case consumer welfare losses are much larger and efficiency gains must be spread over a much smaller output. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines also require that efficiencies be \"merger specific\" -- that is, that they could not reasonably be brought about except by the merger. Under a general welfare test that trades actual consumer losses against producer gains that approach makes sense, but u","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127066193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
American Progressivism inaugurated the beginning of the end of American scientific racism. Its critics have been vocal, however, largely confusing the ideas that Progressives inherited from those they developed for themselves. Progressives have been charged with promotion of eugenics, and thus with mainstreaming practices such as housing segregation, compulsory sterilization of those deemed unfit, and exclusion of immigrants on racial grounds. But if the Progressives were such racists, why is it that since the 1930s Afro-Americans and other people of color have consistently supported self-proclaimed progressive political candidates, and typically by very wide margins?When examining the Progressives on race, it is critical to distinguish the views that they inherited from those that they developed. The rise of Progressivism coincided with the death of scientific racism, which had been taught in American universities since the early nineteenth century and featured prominently in the scientific debate over Darwin’s theory of evolution. Eugenics, which attempted to use genetics and mathematics to validate many racist claims, was its last gasp. The most notable thing about the Progressives is that they were responsible for bringing scientific racism to an end, although that did not happen immediately.My argument here is, first, that one of the most powerful characteristics of the progressive State was its attentiveness to science – a characteristic that it retains to this day. When the Progressive Era was forming, however, genetic racism was the scientific model of the day, cutting across a wide range of disciplines and reaching people of all political persuasions, even into the most elite of American research institutions. By and large, non-Progressives were just as racist as Progressives and some significantly more so. Further, the Progressive period lay entirely within the southern era of Jim Crow legislated segregation, often making it impossible to identify particular racial attitudes in the New South as "Progressive" or simply as inherited features of long held southern racial ideas. The all important question for the historian is, Which racial ideas did the Progressives inherit from their predecessors, and which did they develop on their own?Second, if Progressive public policy on race differed from prevailing alternatives, it was that Progressives believed in a more active State. Racism supported by an activist legislative agenda can be much uglier than racism that is simply tolerated. One cannot characterize most of the segregationist, exclusionary, and other racist legislation passed during this era as "Progressive," however. Southern states actively regulated racial exclusion by statute, and all of the racial zoning laws sometimes attributed to Progressives were passed in formerly slave holding states. Whatever the ideological or scientific sources of these laws, they were supported by staunch anti-Progressives. The same thing is true of co
{"title":"The Progressives: Racism and Public Law","authors":"Herbert Hovenkamp","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2812257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2812257","url":null,"abstract":"American Progressivism inaugurated the beginning of the end of American scientific racism. Its critics have been vocal, however, largely confusing the ideas that Progressives inherited from those they developed for themselves. Progressives have been charged with promotion of eugenics, and thus with mainstreaming practices such as housing segregation, compulsory sterilization of those deemed unfit, and exclusion of immigrants on racial grounds. But if the Progressives were such racists, why is it that since the 1930s Afro-Americans and other people of color have consistently supported self-proclaimed progressive political candidates, and typically by very wide margins?When examining the Progressives on race, it is critical to distinguish the views that they inherited from those that they developed. The rise of Progressivism coincided with the death of scientific racism, which had been taught in American universities since the early nineteenth century and featured prominently in the scientific debate over Darwin’s theory of evolution. Eugenics, which attempted to use genetics and mathematics to validate many racist claims, was its last gasp. The most notable thing about the Progressives is that they were responsible for bringing scientific racism to an end, although that did not happen immediately.My argument here is, first, that one of the most powerful characteristics of the progressive State was its attentiveness to science – a characteristic that it retains to this day. When the Progressive Era was forming, however, genetic racism was the scientific model of the day, cutting across a wide range of disciplines and reaching people of all political persuasions, even into the most elite of American research institutions. By and large, non-Progressives were just as racist as Progressives and some significantly more so. Further, the Progressive period lay entirely within the southern era of Jim Crow legislated segregation, often making it impossible to identify particular racial attitudes in the New South as \"Progressive\" or simply as inherited features of long held southern racial ideas. The all important question for the historian is, Which racial ideas did the Progressives inherit from their predecessors, and which did they develop on their own?Second, if Progressive public policy on race differed from prevailing alternatives, it was that Progressives believed in a more active State. Racism supported by an activist legislative agenda can be much uglier than racism that is simply tolerated. One cannot characterize most of the segregationist, exclusionary, and other racist legislation passed during this era as \"Progressive,\" however. Southern states actively regulated racial exclusion by statute, and all of the racial zoning laws sometimes attributed to Progressives were passed in formerly slave holding states. Whatever the ideological or scientific sources of these laws, they were supported by staunch anti-Progressives. The same thing is true of co","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127734136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper discussed the problems associated with the implementation of the death benefits provisions in South Africa, which were later adopted by the authorities in Lesotho. We reflect on these problems and discuss how these problems could be resolved in Lesotho.
{"title":"Reform of the Death Benefit Provisions in Lesotho's Public Sector Pension Fund: Lessons from South Africa and Swaziland","authors":"Mtendeweka Mhango, Zozo Dyani-Mhango","doi":"10.3366/AJICL.2016.0150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/AJICL.2016.0150","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discussed the problems associated with the implementation of the death benefits provisions in South Africa, which were later adopted by the authorities in Lesotho. We reflect on these problems and discuss how these problems could be resolved in Lesotho.","PeriodicalId":377417,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115044528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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