外交与经济:审视中美关系衰落的根源。1975年的贸易情况

X. Ding
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摘要

1975年,中美贸易爆炸式增长。1971年以后才恢复的贸易以从每年9.2亿美元急剧下降到仅4.61亿美元而告终。崩溃的原因是中华人民共和国(prc)单方面决定从1974年末到1975年初取消几个订单。学者们对中国的行动提出了三个原因,归咎于贸易争端,北京希望惩罚美国在台湾问题上进展缓慢,以及中国贸易官员防止激进分子给他们贴上“买办”的标签。然而,每种解释都夸大了高层政治的重要性,而忽视了中层交流,就像1975年贸易代表团在太平洋两岸来回穿梭一样。这篇文章表明,1975年贸易的真正障碍是中国购买美国粮食的能力有限,与过去四年的数量相同,同时1974年底中国出现了未来丰收的迹象。因此,经济因素更好地解释了中美关系的下降。这是一个例子,说明在文革的最后几年里,北京的经济政策比人们想象的要务实。
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Diplomacy vs. Economics: Examining the Roots of Decline in Sino-U.S. Trade in 1975
In 1975, the explosive growth of Sino-U.S. trade that only had resumed after 1971 ended with a severe decline from $920 million a year to just $461 million. The cause of the collapse was the unilateral decision of the People’s Republic of China (prc) to cancel several orders from late 1974 to early 1975. Scholars have advanced three reasons for the prc’s action, blaming to trade disputes, Beijing’s desire to punish the Americans for slow progress on the Taiwan issue, and Chinese trade officials preventing radicals from labeled them “compradors.” Each explanation, however, overstates the importance of high-level politics and ignores mid-level exchanges, as trade delegations shuttled back and forth across the Pacific in 1975. The article demonstrates that the real obstacle to trade in 1975 was China’s limited ability to purchase American grain in the same quantities as in the last four years, along with indications of a good future harvest in China emerging at the end of 1974. Economic factors therefore better explain the decline in prc-U.S. trade, providing an example of how in the last years of the Cultural Revolution, Beijing’s economic policy was more pragmatic than one would expect.
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