媒体真的是伟大的信息均衡器吗?《华尔街日报》对企业财报的报道对信息传递中同伴信息不对称的影响

Jing Xia
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引用次数: 0

摘要

先前的研究普遍发现,金融媒体通过降低不成熟投资者的信息获取成本,在投资者之间创造了公平的竞争环境。在信息传递的背景下,我证明了当媒体报道可能降低成熟和不成熟投资者的行业信息获取成本时,他们的信息差距可能会扩大。具体来说,我发现《华尔街日报》(WSJ)对焦点公司财报的同一天报道加剧了业内同行在焦点公司财报当天的信息不对称。然而,当华尔街日报的文章在EA之后一天发表时,在EA当天和之后的一天,对等信息不对称都没有变化。进一步的分析表明,当《华尔街日报》当日报道更有可能降低同行投资者的行业信息获取成本,以及当推断焦点公司EA对同行的影响需要更高的信息整合成本时,对同行信息不对称的影响更强。这些发现表明,尽管媒体报道在信息传播中很重要,但它可能会增加投资者之间的信息不对称。
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Is Media Really the Great Information Equalizer? The Effects of WSJ Coverage of Firm Earnings Announcements on Peer Information Asymmetry in Information Transfers
Prior research generally finds that the financial media levels the playing field among investors by reducing information acquisition costs for unsophisticated investors. In the setting of information transfers, I demonstrate that when media coverage is likely to reduce the industry information acquisition costs for both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, their information gap may be widened. Specifically, I find that same-day Wall Street Journal (WSJ) coverage of a focal firm’s earnings announcement (EA) exacerbates information asymmetry of its industry peers around the focal firm’s EA day. However, when the WSJ article is published one day after the EA, there is no change in peer information asymmetry on both the EA day and the day after. Additional analysis shows that the effects of same-day WSJ coverage on peer information asymmetry are stronger when it is more likely to reduce peer investors’ industry information acquisition costs and when inferring the implications of the focal firm EA for the peer entails higher information integration costs. These findings suggest that media coverage may increase information asymmetry among investors despite its importance in information dissemination.
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