意识还是意识?解缠的建模

C. Castelfranchi
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在讨论了斯洛曼极具挑战性的干预中可能存在的矛盾之后,我强调不需要将“意识”与现象意识和“感质”问题等同起来。我认为有必要区分“意识”的不同形式和功能,并明确地对它们进行建模,也可以利用人工智能的特殊优势:通过分离人类行为/思想中无法分离的东西,使实验在自然界中变得不可能。至于现象意识,一个人首先应该能够模拟拥有“身体”和“感觉”它的意义。
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CONSCIOUSNESS OR CONSCIOUSNESSES? MODELING FOR DISENTANGLING
After discussing a possible contradiction in Sloman's very challenging intervention, I stress the need for not identifying "consciousness" with phenomenal consciousness and with the "qualia" problem. I claim that it is necessary to distinguish different forms and functions of "consciousness" and to explicitly model them, also by exploiting the specific advantage of AI: to make experiments impossible in nature, by separating what cannot be separated in human behavior/mind. As for phenomenal consciousness, one should first be able to model what it means to have a "body" and to "feel" it.
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