{"title":"具有非凸策略空间的竞赛","authors":"Doron Klunover, J. Morgan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3248730","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the Nash equilibria of a class of two-player contests with \"lumpy\" effort. Our main result shows that under quite reasonable conditions, constraints on the players' choice sets heighten competition. This stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that regulation decreases competition, but appears to be consistent with anecdotal evidence. Examples of this phenomenon include arms control, rules and regulations in sports, and drug wars. We also show that a constraint on available strategies can benefit a player.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Contests with a Non-Convex Strategy Space\",\"authors\":\"Doron Klunover, J. Morgan\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3248730\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We characterize the Nash equilibria of a class of two-player contests with \\\"lumpy\\\" effort. Our main result shows that under quite reasonable conditions, constraints on the players' choice sets heighten competition. This stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that regulation decreases competition, but appears to be consistent with anecdotal evidence. Examples of this phenomenon include arms control, rules and regulations in sports, and drug wars. We also show that a constraint on available strategies can benefit a player.\",\"PeriodicalId\":393761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-09-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3248730\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3248730","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We characterize the Nash equilibria of a class of two-player contests with "lumpy" effort. Our main result shows that under quite reasonable conditions, constraints on the players' choice sets heighten competition. This stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that regulation decreases competition, but appears to be consistent with anecdotal evidence. Examples of this phenomenon include arms control, rules and regulations in sports, and drug wars. We also show that a constraint on available strategies can benefit a player.