为缓解付出代价:新西兰如何为其他国家的努力作出贡献

Suzi Kerr, Catherine Leining
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引用次数: 16

摘要

购买国际减排量可以帮助新西兰为减缓全球气候变化作出更有雄心和更具成本效益的贡献,并支持发展中国家加速其低排放转型。然而,新西兰必须避免过去的错误,确保国际采购不会破坏自己的脱碳之路。此外,《巴黎协定》从根本上改变了各国在2021年至2030年期间的贸易方式。这份工作文件是根据Motu的碳排放交易体系对话进程从2016年到2018年演变而来的,重点是我们如何平衡国际和国内的减排努力。它探讨了我们可能需要多少个国际减排机构,我们应该如何将国际减排支持与参与者在新西兰排放交易计划(NZ ETS)下的义务结合起来,以及我们可以利用哪些机制有效地为国际减排提供资金。从根本上说,新西兰政府需要确保所有计入其目标并在新西兰排放交易体系中被接受的IERs都具有环境完整性,并且得到卖方和买方政府的批准,而不是重复计算。本文提出了一个适用于新西兰碳排放权购买的工作模型,其中数量由政府控制,采购在可预见的未来由政府管理(私人实体可能参与),数量被纳入新西兰碳排放交易体系上限和价格管理机制的决策中。如果新西兰排放交易体系的参与者能够在未来购买IERs,那么数量限制应按照交出义务的百分比适用,并且数量应抵消上限下的其他供应。该文件还强调了国际气候变化合作的创新“气候团队”机制,该机制可以促进新西兰政府的购买。两份配套的工作文件讨论了国际采购决策与新西兰排放交易体系限额和价格管理机制选择之间的相互作用。这三篇工作论文详细阐述了Kerr等人(2017年)提出的管理新西兰碳排放交易体系单位供应、价格和链接的综合建议。
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Paying for Mitigation: How New Zealand Can Contribute to Others’ Efforts
Purchasing international emission reductions (IERs) can help New Zealand make a more ambitious and cost-effective contribution toward global climate change mitigation and support developing countries in accelerating their low-emission transition. However, New Zealand must avoid past mistakes by ensuring international purchasing does not derail its own decarbonisation pathway. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement has fundamentally changed how countries will trade IERs over the 2021–30 period. This working paper, which evolved under Motu’s ETS Dialogue process from 2016 to 2018, focuses on how we can balance our international and domestic mitigation efforts. It explores how many IERs we may want, how we should integrate international mitigation support with participants’ obligations under the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS), and what mechanisms we can use to fund international mitigation effectively. Fundamentally, the New Zealand government will need to ensure that all IERs counted toward its targets and accepted in the NZ ETS have environmental integrity and are both approved and not double counted by seller and buyer governments. This paper presents a working model for New Zealand’s purchase of IERs, in which the quantity is controlled by government, purchasing is managed by government for the foreseeable future (with potential participation by private entities), and the quantity is factored into decisions on the NZ ETS cap and price management mechanisms. If NZ ETS participants are able to purchase IERs in the future, then a quantity limit should apply as a percentage of the surrender obligation and the volume should offset other supply under the cap. The paper also highlights an innovative “climate team” mechanism for international climate change cooperation that could facilitate purchasing by the New Zealand government. Two companion working papers address interactions between decisions on international purchasing and the choice of NZ ETS cap and price management mechanisms. The three working papers elaborate on an integrated proposal for managing unit supply, prices, and linking in the NZ ETS that was presented in Kerr et al. (2017).
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