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引用次数: 0

摘要

立法往往落后于技术。虽然数万亿美元通过网上交易安全、廉价、即时地进行交易,但工人们仍然必须等待两周到一个月才能收到雇主的付款。在现代经济中,工人们实际上是在把钱借给雇主,因为他们等待支付自己挣来的工资。在半自动收银台排队用信用卡付款的工人依赖于过时的工资系统,该系统只在“发薪日”转移支付。工人们,尤其是那些靠工资过日子的人,很难满足他们的日常需求,转而求助于昂贵的短期信贷产品——尤其是发薪日贷款机构。虽然对信贷的需求是真实存在的,但信贷提供者收取的价格却很高,往往导致无休止的债务螺旋式上升。那么,为什么发薪日还存在呢?本文研究了各种各样的解释——经济的、历史的、行为的和法律的。一个主要的结论是,发薪日的存在归功于遗留的法律架构。也就是说,发薪日是软件问题,而不是硬件问题。hardware-i.e。金钱和工资技术就在这里。我们可以按日支付工人工资;事实上,发展中国家的零工经济工作者通常比从事同样工作的美国雇员获得更快的报酬。阻碍我们前进的是我们的法律软件:过时的艾森豪威尔时代的立法未能预见到技术变革。令人惊讶的是,即使是支持工人的立法,如最低工资法,也在无意中鼓励了这种做法。通过揭示被忽视和过时的维持发薪日的法律基础设施,文章提出了法律改革的途径。每天支付给工人的现金流是可行的、实际的,而且比大多数人意识到的要高效得多。有针对性的改革可以有效地结束让工人在等待发薪日期间借钱给雇主的令人困惑和有害的做法。
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Payday
Legislation lags behind technology all too often. While trillions of dollars are exchanged in online transactions—safely, cheaply, and instantaneously—workers still must wait two weeks to a month to receive payments from their employers. In the modern economy, workers are effectively lending money to their employers, as they wait for earned wages to be paid.

The same worker who taps a credit card to pay for groceries in semi-automated checkout lines depends on dated payroll systems that only transfer payments on a “payday.” Workers, especially those living paycheck-to-paycheck, are hard-pressed to meet their daily needs and turn to expensive, short-term credit products—notably, payday lenders. While the need for credit is a real one, credit providers charge a steep price, often culminating in endless debt spirals. So, why does the payday still exist?

This Article studies various explanations—economic, historical, behavioral, and legal. A primary conclusion is that the payday owes its existence to legacy legal architecture. That is, payday is a software problem, not a hardware problem. The hardware—i.e., money and payroll technology—is here. We can pay workers daily; in fact, gig economy workers in developing countries will often be paid more quickly than an American employee for the same work. What holds us back is our legal software: Dated Eisenhower-era legislation that failed to anticipate technological change. Surprisingly, even pro-worker legislation, such as minimum wage laws, inadvertently encourage the practice.

By revealing the overlooked and dated legal infrastructure that sustains the payday, the Article suggests a path for legal reform. Daily streams of payment to workers are feasible, practical, and far more efficient than most people realize. A focused reform could effectively bring an end to the puzzling and pernicious practice of having workers lend money to their employers while they wait for their payday.
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