澳大利亚财务规划专业化:制度逻辑视角

Daniel W. Richards, Sarath Lal Ukwatte Jalathge, Prem W. Senarath Yapa
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引用次数: 1

摘要

目的研究澳大利亚的理财专业化。作者调查了主要机构的制度逻辑是如何阻碍这一职业走向专业地位的。设计/方法/方法本研究使用了1997年至2017年政府对澳大利亚金融服务调查的文献分析,以确定与财务规划专业化相关的各种制度逻辑。该方法包括从数据中产生想法,并应用制度逻辑框架来理解澳大利亚财务规划专业化的障碍。监管机构采用了一种自我监管的逻辑,赋予金融机构管理金融咨询的权力。这些金融机构有一个利润最大化的逻辑,在财务规划中产生了利益冲突。由于竞争激烈的专业环境,理财专业团体采取了吸引和留住成员的逻辑。因此,财务规划师没有被定义为受托人,专业标准没有提高,存在无效的纪律决议制度。研究的局限性/意义本研究说明了在澳大利亚实现财务规划专业化需要解决的各种制度逻辑。然而,所使用的数据仅限于从议会调查中获得的数据。先前对会计等职业出现的研究表明,金融机构是专业化的场所。本研究表明,金融机构阻碍了理财专业化。此外,在国家赋予其他职业合法性的情况下,本研究表明,国家监管机构的自我监管逻辑并没有使财务规划合法化。
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The Professionalization of Financial Planning in Australia: an Institutional Logics Perspective
PurposeThis paper researches the professionalization of financial planning in Australia. The authors investigate how the institutional logic of major institutions inhibits this occupation from moving toward a professional status.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses documentary analysis of government inquiries into Australian financial services from 1997 to 2017 to ascertain the various institutional logics relating to the professionalization of financial planning. The method involves generating ideas from the data and applying an institutional logic framework to make sense of impediments to the professionalization of financial planning in Australia.FindingsThe regulator adopted a self-regulation logic that empowered financial institutions to govern financial advice. These financial institutions have a logic of profit maximization that creates conflicts of interest in financial planning. The financial planning professional bodies adopted a logic of attracting and retaining members due to a competitive professional environment. Thus, financial planners have not been defined as fiduciaries, professional standards have not increased and an ineffective disciplinary resolution system exists.Research limitations/implicationsThis research illustrates the various institutional logics that need to be addressed to professionalize financial planning in Australia. However, the data used is limited to that drawn from the parliamentary inquiries.Originality/valuePrior research on the emergence of professions such as accounting has shown that financial institutions are sites of professionalization. This research shows that financial institutions impede professionalization in financial planning. Also, where the state granted legitimacy to other professions, this research indicates that the state regulator's logic of self-regulation has not legitimized financial planning.
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