{"title":"经验的结构","authors":"D. Papineau","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, the qualitative view is outlined and shown to avoid the problems facing representationalism. The qualitative view is defended as a ‘pure paint’ view and distinguished from the ‘partial paint’ views of Block and Peacocke. The structure of experience is acknowledged. ‘Intentional objects’ are explained, and the dangers of equating them with elements of experience are exposed. The idea that mental ‘paint’ might ‘point’ is discredited.","PeriodicalId":317000,"journal":{"name":"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Structure of Experience\",\"authors\":\"D. Papineau\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this chapter, the qualitative view is outlined and shown to avoid the problems facing representationalism. The qualitative view is defended as a ‘pure paint’ view and distinguished from the ‘partial paint’ views of Block and Peacocke. The structure of experience is acknowledged. ‘Intentional objects’ are explained, and the dangers of equating them with elements of experience are exposed. The idea that mental ‘paint’ might ‘point’ is discredited.\",\"PeriodicalId\":317000,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience\",\"volume\":\"15 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this chapter, the qualitative view is outlined and shown to avoid the problems facing representationalism. The qualitative view is defended as a ‘pure paint’ view and distinguished from the ‘partial paint’ views of Block and Peacocke. The structure of experience is acknowledged. ‘Intentional objects’ are explained, and the dangers of equating them with elements of experience are exposed. The idea that mental ‘paint’ might ‘point’ is discredited.
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